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Abstract 
Recent theoretical papers suggest that high uncertainty about firms’ economic 
prospects can explain delays in the adjustment of their stock prices to economic news. Using 
analyst forecast revisions and earnings announcements as proxies of news, we find mixed 
evidence in support of this hypothesis. We confirm that stocks of firms whose prospects are 
highly uncertain display a relatively large delayed price reaction (so-called continuation) 
after the release of news, but we argue that this evidence does not necessarily imply a slower 
adjustment speed. Indeed, for these stocks the immediate reaction to news is also relatively 
strong. In fact, the magnitude of the delayed price reaction (the price continuation) depends 
both on the degree of price sluggishness and on the “scale” of the news hitting the stock. We 
therefore consider both the delayed and immediate responses, and compute measures of 
adjustment speed that do not depend on the “scale” of the news. We then compare these 
measures across portfolios of stocks characterized by different degrees of uncertainty. Our 
findings indicate that: (i) stock prices characterized by high uncertainty tend to adjust to bad 
news more sluggishly than those characterized by low uncertainty; (ii) the opposite holds 
true in the case of good news; (iii) stock prices characterized by high uncertainty tend to 
adjust to bad news more sluggishly than to good news. Previous empirical literature focuses 
on price continuation patterns but neglects to control for the “scale” of the news, reaching 
erroneous conclusions. 
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1.  Introduction 
Over the last 20 years, a large literature has documented price continuation anomalies 
in the stock market, i.e. that future stock returns are predictable based on information that is 
public at a certain date, and should therefore have already been incorporated into prices. 
Among the best-documented instances of price continuation are the post-earnings 
announcement drift (Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990)), the post-analyst forecast revisions 
price drift (Stickel (1991); Gleason and Lee (2003)), and momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993), (2001); Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996)).  
Investors’ underreaction to new information is one common explanation for these 
patterns: new information may take time to work its way into stock prices, giving rise to 
lagged adjustment. One prominent strand of the literature that has tried to rigorously model 
underreaction to news relies on behavioral theories, which posit that investors suffer from 
some form of irrationality (see Thaler (1993)). Cognitive biases such as conservatism or 
overconfidence, well documented in the psychology literature, have been incorporated into 
formal models yielding underreaction patterns.
1 Some of these theories imply that 
psychological biases should be stronger when there is more uncertainty about a stock’s value 
(see in particular Hong and Stein (1999), Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmaniam (2001)). In 
his survey of this literature, Hirshleifer (2001) summarizes the point as follows: “greater 
                                                 
1  In Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) conservative investors tend to change their opinions too slowly, 
generating underreaction to news. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmaniam (1998, 2001) build on investors’ 
overconfidence in their private signals (the belief that the signal is more precise than it really is): 
overconfidence causes investors to underweight public information as it is released, so that this information 
will take a relatively long time to work its way into the stock price. In Hong and Stein (1999) underreaction 
stems from the gradual diffusion of private information across the population of investors. These theories 
also try to explain longer term overreaction, another well documented stock price anomaly. We overlook 
this aspect because, as we discuss below, our focus is on testing the implications of these theories for the 
hypothesis that stock prices underreact to new information in the short-term.    6
uncertainty about a set of stocks … leaves more room for psychological biases. At the 
extreme, it is relatively hard to misperceive an asset that is nearly risk-free” (p. 1575).
2 
Some recent empirical papers have tried to test this a priori. Zhang (2006) argues that 
if investors underreact to new information due to psychological biases, and if such biases are 
stronger when there is uncertainty about a firm’s value, then underreaction patterns will be 
stronger for stocks of firms characterized by greater uncertainty. To test this claim, he 
partitions his sample of US stocks into a high and a low uncertainty group (according to 
various uncertainty proxies), and shows that the former group is characterized by relatively 
high price continuation. Zhang interprets his finding as supporting the hypothesis that slow 
price adjustment reflects investor underreaction to new information due to psychological 
biases. Other authors reach similar conclusions. For instance, Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) 
find that momentum is stronger for the shares of firms characterized by small size or low 
(residual) analysts coverage (uncertainty proxies similar to those used by Zhang (2006)), and 
interpret this as evidence that momentum reflects the gradual diffusion of information about 
high uncertainty firms across investors.
3  
In this paper we propose a sharper test of the hypothesis that the price adjustment to 
economic news is slower for stocks of high uncertainty firms, and present new evidence on 
the issue. The above papers focus on price continuation phenomena, i.e. on the magnitude of 
the delayed stock price reaction to news. This focus is interesting per se, and is coherent with 
                                                 
2  Alternative theories trying to explain stock price anomalies assume rational investors subject to uncertainty 
(see e.g. Brav and Heaton (2002) and the references therein). The idea is that in the presence of uncertainty 
Bayesian investors will face a signal extraction problem, which will cause new information to affect prices 
gradually. A recent strand focuses on investors’ rational inattention: as information processing is costly, 
investors may overlook economic news (Huang and Liu (2007)), take time to learn their information content 
(Peng (2005), Peng and Xiong (2006)), or be distracted (DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), Hirshleifer, Lim and 
Teoh (2007)). 
3   In these papers, as in ours, information uncertainty means that new information has uncertain implications 
for a firm’s value, without distinguishing whether this is due to the volatility of a firm’s underlying 
fundamentals, or to poor information on the firm itself (opacity).   7
the definition of underreaction commonly adopted in the literature, i.e. that good (bad) future 
stock returns can be predicted from good (bad) past performance.
4 However this definition, 
and the focus on price continuation, can be misleading when the purpose of the analysis is to 
compare underreaction patterns across groups of stocks with different characteristics, as in 
our case.  
Our basic point is that the magnitude of the delayed price reaction (the price 
continuation) depends both on the degree of price sluggishness and on the “dimension” of the 
news hitting the stock, and is therefore, in principle, uninformative about the adjustment 
speed. Telling which class of stocks adjusts to news more rapidly requires a “scale-free” 
measure, i.e. one that is independent of the dimension of the news. To this end, both the 
immediate and the delayed stock price reaction to the news must be considered. An example 
may help clarify this point.  
 
Fig. 1: Stock prices reaction to the arrival of bad news: 
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4  This definition is taken from Brav and Heaton (2002). Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Zhang (2006) 
adopt a similar one.    8
Consider two stocks (or portfolios of stocks), A and B, and suppose that the price of 
stock A reacts in a relatively rapid fashion to news, whereas B is more sluggish, due e.g. to 
informational opacity. Suppose that at a certain date both stocks are “hit” by unexpected bad 
news. However, for stock A the news is particularly bad, whereas for B it is only moderately 
negative, so the price adjustment is large for A, from 100 to 90, and small for B, from 100 to 
98. Figure 1 reports the two price responses.
5 By assumption, the price of B will move slowly 
to the new equilibrium: one quarter of the adjustment (-0.5 percent in terms of returns) takes 
place on date 16, when the news is released, the remaining three quarters (an additional -1.5 
percent) in subsequent periods. The price of A instead moves relatively fast: half of the 
adjustment (-5.0 percent) is immediate and half is delayed. The point of the example is that, 
looking only at the delayed price response, one could conclude that underreaction is stronger 
for stock A (-5.0 percent is larger in absolute value than -1.5 percent) in spite that its price is 
less sluggish by assumption.  
Summing up, to test whether the price of stock A underreacts to news more than that 
of stock B, one must measure their adjustment speed. An intuitive way to control for the size 
of the surprise, suggested by the figure, is to take the ratio between the delayed and the 
immediate returns. In a nutshell, this is what we do: we compute and compare several 
alternative estimators of stock price adjustment speed across portfolios of stocks characterized 
by different degrees of uncertainty.  
It is worth noting that the methodological point illustrated in figure 1 is quite general. 
It holds regardless of whether the slow reaction of stock prices to news reflects cognitive 
biases or other causes, e.g. rational behavior under uncertainty, and it applies whenever the 
purpose of the analysis is to compare price reaction patterns across different groups of stocks.  
                                                 
5  The figure reports fictitious data to illustrate the example discussed in the text. Similar curves are derived in 
various theoretical models (see e.g. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmaniam (1998), Brav and Heaton (2002)).   9
To test the hypothesis that the price adjustment to economic news is slower for stocks 
of high uncertainty firms, we consider two types of news, corresponding to the two above-
mentioned instances of price continuation: the post-analyst revisions price drift and the post-
earnings announcement drift (PEAD). In the first case, the news is the revision of analyst 
earnings forecasts; in the second, the release of quarterly earnings. In either case, we proceed 
as follows: we partition stocks into a “good news” and a “bad news” group; we sort each 
group in ascending order of uncertainty, using several proxies of uncertainty; for each news 
group, we compare the stock price adjustment speed of high versus low uncertainty stocks.  
The exercises focusing on the post-analyst revisions price drift are interesting in their 
own right, and because they allow us to clearly contrast our results to those in Zhang (2006). 
However, the underlying dataset does not readily lend itself to measuring news arrival and 
stock price reaction with precision, as analyst forecasts revisions are computed on a monthly 
basis. Our second set of exercises is based on the PEAD anomaly, probably the hardest to 
reconcile with market rationality (Fama (1998)). In this case, knowledge of the day of the 
actual quarterly earnings release allows us to compute more precise measures of the 
immediate and delayed stock price reaction to news, and hence of price sluggishness. In spite 
of these differences, the exercises performed on the two datasets deliver broadly coherent 
results. 
Overall, our evidence offers only partial support to the thesis that the prices of high 
uncertainty stocks are relatively more sluggish. In a nutshell, we find that while the speed 
with which the prices of high uncertainty stocks adjust to bad news is equal or lower than that 
of low uncertainty stocks, as suggested by the theories summarized above, the opposite 
finding holds true in the case of good news. Moreover, there is strong evidence that the prices 
of high uncertainty stocks adjust more slowly to bad news than to good news. These results 
may help to discriminate among alternative explanations of the underreaction hypothesis. In   10
particular, we discuss our findings in the context of theories of short-sale constraints and of 
managers incentives and discretion. 
Our results also cast new light on price continuation patterns. In the case of negative 
quarterly earnings surprises, price continuation is observed both among low and high 
uncertainty stocks, and it is stronger among the latter, confirming existing results. When good 
news are considered, price continuation for high uncertainty stocks is found to be lower, equal 
or higher than that for low uncertainty stocks, depending on the proxy of uncertainty, or of 
news.  
Our paper is related methodologically to recent papers studying the PEAD. 
Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2007) and DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) test the hypothesis that 
the price adjustment following earning announcements is more sluggish if investors are 
“distracted”. They divide stocks into two groups, depending on whether their announcements 
take place on “normal” days or on “high distraction” days, and compare the immediate vs. 
delayed price reaction, similarly to what we do below. In the former paper, “high distraction” 
days are those featuring a great number of earnings announcements, which compete for 
investors’ limited attention; in the latter they are Fridays, when investors are distracted by the 
perspective of the week-end. Both papers show that on “normal” days the stock price 
adjustment is faster, and the drift is smaller, relative to “high distraction” days. 
The next section presents the testing strategy in detail, justifies our use of four 
alternative measures of adjustment speed, and discusses some important methodological 
aspects. Section 3 illustrates our two main datasets. Sections 4 and 5 report the bulk of the 
empirical analysis, mainly focusing on the high vs. low uncertainty cut, whereas section 6 
describes the bad vs. good news dimension of our results. In section 7 we summarize the main 
findings and discuss their economic interpretation. Section 8 concludes.   11
2.  Testing strategy 
In this section we describe the methodology which we apply, with small adaptations, 
to the two well-known instances of price continuation mentioned above: the post-analyst 
forecast revisions price drift and the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD), analyzed in 
sections 4 and 5, respectively.  
We denote by 
j
T S  the news hitting stock j at time T. We measure the immediate 
reaction to 
j
T S  by the stock’s abnormal return around the announcement of the news, 
j
T r , and 
the delayed reaction by the abnormal return in the following period, 
j
d T r  .
6 To compare the 
speed with which the stock prices of firms characterized by different degrees of informational 
opacity react to news we proceed as follows. In each period T we partition stocks into 3 
groups, depending on whether 
j
T S  is positive, zero or negative. Within the positive and 
negative groups we then sort stocks into 5 quintiles, based on several proxies for information 
uncertainty (to be described below), one at the time. We replicate the procedure for each 
period, and compute our adjustment speed estimators for the four relevant portfolios (bad vs. 
good news, high vs. low uncertainty) over the available sample period.
7 We add uppercase 
superscripts to denote uncertainty and news types portfolios, so that 
N U j
T r
, , , say, denotes the 
immediate abnormal return for stock j belonging to the first (U=L) or the fifth (U=H) 
uncertainty quintile, in either the bad news (N=B) or good news (N=G) portfolios. We omit 
superscripts whenever not necessary. 
                                                 
6   Throughout the paper we use abnormal returns, in the tradition of the literature on event studies. The idea is 
that using delayed and current returns to make inference on stock price sluggishness makes sense only if 
returns measure the actual reaction to the news, correcting for possible risk premia and predictable 
components. 
7  The results presented below remain virtually unchanged if the order of the sorts is reversed – i.e. if 
uncertainty quintiles are computed first.    12
We begin by checking the magnitude of the immediate and delayed price reactions for 
these portfolios. Consider the good news portfolios (the reasoning for the bad news is 
symmetric), and suppose we observe  0 ) ( ) (




T r mean r mean  and 
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d T r mean r mean . This can be seen as first evidence that the prices of high 
uncertainty stocks are more sluggish than those of low uncertainty stocks. However, simply 
looking at these sample means does not allow us to say whether the adjustment speeds of the 
two portfolios are statistically different; all the more so if the first inequality is replaced by 
0 ) ( ) (




T r mean r mean , a case we often encounter in the empirical analysis below. What 
we need is a synthetic measure of price sluggishness and a joint test of the two inequalities. A 
natural measure of sluggishness is given by in the following expression: 
(1)     ) ( / ) (




N U r mean r mean    ,     U = L, H;  N=B, G. 
Note that  measures the magnitude of the delayed return relative to that of the 
immediate return, doing away with the potential problem illustrated in figure 1.
8 The case =0 
corresponds to a pure random walk hypothesis, i.e. to market efficiency, and to infinite price 
adjustment speed. If >0 there is price continuation; the larger the value of the statistic, the 
slower the adjustment. Finally, <0 entails price overreaction/reversal.
9  
A potential drawback of the mean estimator (1) is that it could be hiding asymmetries 
in the distributions of individual stock price reactions within the various portfolios. Consider 
                                                 
8  Similar measures are used by Masulis and Shivakumar (2002), DellaVigna and Pollet (2009). For each of 
the two portfolios whose adjustment speed they compare, they compute a ratio that, in our notation, can be 
written as mean(
j




d T r  )].  
9  For the estimator  U   to be a good measure of adjustment speed, 
j
T r  must be a good measure of the stock 
price reaction to the arrival of news; no other surprise should hit the stock during the adjustment period, i.e. 
from T to T+d; the adjustment must be completed by T+d. In the empirical work presented below some of 
these conditions may not be met, so we modify our setup in various ways to check the robustness of our 
results.    13
e.g. the good news, high uncertainty portfolio, and suppose that 
j
d T r   has a zero mean 
binomial distribution, say 
j
d T r  = -0.9 with probability 0.1, and 0.1 with probability 0.9. In this 
case estimator (1) would correctly yield ρ
H= 0, yet 90 percent of the stocks would display 
some price sluggishness. While the example is clearly ad hoc, it illustrates the concrete 
possibility that estimator (1) delivers a message which does not reflect the behavior of the 
majority of individual stocks in a portfolio.  
To control for this possibility and gain additional insights on the phenomenon, we also 
compute three other measures of price sluggishness. The first is the share of stocks displaying 
price continuation within each portfolio, i.e. the percentage of stocks whose price in period 
T+1 moves in the same direction as in T, provided that the move in T is coherent with the sign 
of the surprise. For brevity, we shall refer to this statistic as the “share”:  
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          U = L, H;  N=B, G. 
This statistic would be equal to 0.9 in the case of the above example, correctly 
signaling an asymmetric distribution of 
j
d T r  , whereas it would yield a message analogous to 
that of estimator (1) if the distribution were symmetric.
10 Indeed, whereas (1) may be affected 
by asymmetries in the numerator as well as in the denominator, the share is immune from this 
problem.  
One drawback of the “share” is that it does not yield a direct measure of adjustment 
speed. Thus, we also compute the following two additional median-based estimators of 
U,N:   
                                                 
10  This statistic is related to the early tests of the random walk hypothesis, which compared the frequency of 
sequences (pairs of consecutive returns with the same sign) with that of reversals (pairs of consecutive 
returns with opposite signs) in historical stock returns. See Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997).   14
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          U = L, H; N = B, G. 
(4)   ) / (




N U r r median    ,               
Used in conjunction with the “share”, these estimators are suitable to capture 
asymmetries in the distribution of 
j
d T r  . We shall see that these asymmetries do emerge from 
the data, raising the issue of which measure of adjustment speed – mean-based vs. median-
based – one should eventually favor and draw conclusions upon.  
In practice, estimators (1)-(4) and the related standard errors are computed as follows.  
The ratio of means in (1) is obtained by taking averages of the numerator and denominator  
over the pooled cross-section-time series dataset for each portfolio (high vs. low uncertainty, 
bad vs. good news). To test for equality of the s across the various portfolios, we first 
compute the ratio 
j
d T r  /
j
T r  for each stock and time period T. Next, we arrange the data in a 
panel and regress this ratio on four zero-one portfolio dummies. We use a weighted 
regression, in which each observation is weighted by 
j
T r  scaled by the sum of 
j
T r  across all j. 
This ensures that the regression coefficients equal the  obtained as in (1). The standard errors 
are adjusted for clustering at the date level. The “shares” in (2) are obtained as follows. First, 
shares are calculated for each portfolio and time period using a relative frequency approach, 
obtaining a time series for each portfolio. The four time series are then stacked in a panel and 
regressed on the usual four zero-one portfolio dummies. The estimated “shares” are the 
coefficients from these regressions; the related standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. The ratio of medians (3) and its standard error are obtained via an 
analogous regression. To derive the median of ratios (4) we first compute the ratio 
j
d T r  /
j
T r  for 
each stock, obtaining a time series for each stock. The time series are then stacked in a panel 
and regressed on the usual four zero-one portfolio dummies. We use a quantile regression,   15
which ensures that the dummy coefficients are equal to the median of the individual ratios 
computed over the pooled cross section-time series data for each portfolio.  
3.  Data  
Our two datasets are derived from three main sources: CRSP for returns, Compustat 
for quarterly balance sheet and income statement data, and I/B/E/S for analyst forecasts on 
quarterly earnings per share. The sample period goes from January 1985 to the end of 2005. 
Data relate to companies with ordinary shares quoted on the NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq. We 
use all sectors and consider only ordinary shares (i.e. we exclude American Depository 
Receipts and Exchange Traded Funds). All measures of analyst forecasts were computed from 
the unadjusted detailed history I/B/E/S dataset. This method avoids a rounding bias which has 
previously been noted to affect I/B/E/S final adjusted statistics (see e.g. Diether, Malloy and 
Scherbina (2002)). Following Zhang (2006), we dropped all observations for which the 
forecast revision, or the forecast error, was larger, in absolute value, than the stock price at the 
end of the previous year. In addition, to eliminate illiquid stocks and stocks of newly quoted 
companies (possibly IPOs), we dropped observations for which the price was lower than 5 US 
dollars or the age of the company (measured with the time since first CRSP quotation) was 
less than one year.  
The dataset on the post-analyst revisions price drift, used in section 4, comprises the 
following variables. 
j
T FOR  , , expressed in current dollars, is the simple average of the 
forecasts of quarter  earnings per share released by the various analysts covering the stock 
during month T  (source: I/B/E/S). The baseline results presented below are derived by 
defining news as 
j
T S  , = (
j
T FOR  , -
j
T FOR  , 1  )/
j
T P 1  , the revision in analyst forecast between the 
end of month T and the end of month T-1 (computed on a balanced panel of analysts),   16
normalized by the stock’s lagged price. The forecasts are adjusted to eliminate the rounding 
error previously described, and stale forecasts (defined as those not confirmed by the analyst 
during month T) are discarded. When actual earnings data relating to a given quarter are 
published, the focus shifts to the next quarter, and the news is redefined as 
j
T S 1 ,   . In the 
analysis we overlook the fact that, as T increases, the length of the forecasting horizon 
declines. Accordingly, we omit the  subscript. We adopt the following six commonly used 
proxies of information uncertainty, defined so that larger values denote higher uncertainty 
levels. 
j
T MV / 1  is the reciprocal of market capitalization of the firm at the end of month T, in 
million of dollars. 
j
T COV / 1 , is the reciprocal of the total number of analysts who covered the 
company at least once during the previous year. 
j
T AGE / 1  is the reciprocal of the firm’s age, 
measured by the number of years that the firm has been present in the CRSP dataset. 
j
T SIGMA  
is the standard deviation of weekly (Thursday to Wednesday) excess returns computed over 
the 52 weeks ending in month T. 
j
T CVOL  is the standard deviation of the ratio of operative 
income (Compustat #21) over average total assets (Compustat #44), computed over 20 
quarters (where unavailable, over a minimum of 8 quarters).
11 
j
T DISP  is the standard 
deviation of valid analyst forecasts at the end of month T, scaled by the stock price at the end 
of the previous year (source: I/B/E/S).  
The concept of uncertainty we refer to is investors’ subjective uncertainty about the 
true value of a stock, regardless of what determines it. This uncertainty could be caused by an 
intrinsic characteristics of the firm, e.g. high cash-flows volatility, or by incentive-driven 
motivations, e.g. investors’ low level of attention for small firm stocks, or the firm’s manager 
                                                 
11  The operative income series was seasonally adjusted by taking the difference between values in the current 
quarter and the corresponding quarter of the previous year. The results obtained using this uncertainty proxy 
relate to non-banks only, due to data availability problems.   17
choice of the degree of opaqueness. Reliance on several proxies aims to capture different 
aspects of information uncertainty, as well as the possibility that each proxy might capture 
things other than uncertainty. For example, firm size and analyst coverage are also commonly 
used to proxy for investor recognition in the literature that examines delays in price 
adjustment due to “neglected firm” effects, a concept related to our definition of information 
uncertainty (see e.g. Hou and Moskowitz (2005)). Moreover, proxies of uncertainty such as 
market capitalization tend also to be related to (and are often used as an indicator of) stock 
liquidity. Since liquidity, or the presence of short-selling constraints, might induce price 
sluggishness, driving our results independently of uncertainty, this is a factor we shall try to 
control for in our analysis. A word of caveat is also warranted for 
j
T DISP , the dispersion in 
analyst forecasts. This proxy cannot be computed for firms with one or no analyst coverage 
which, as just mentioned, are likely to be small, opaque, “neglected-type” ones. We refer to 
Zhang (2006) for a more detailed discussion of these proxies and of their use in previous 
literature. 
The immediate abnormal return of stock j in month T, denoted by 
j
T r , is computed as 
the percentage month-on-month change in the dividend-adjusted price minus the market 
return in the same month, computed using the value-weighted CRSP index. Stock prices are 
measured at month-end, in current dollars. The delayed abnormal return, denoted 
j
d T r  , is 
computed by compounding monthly returns over the following d months (our baseline results 
are derived using d = 1, but we analyze different values in the robustness checks section). 
This dataset has a monthly frequency and totals about 590,000 observations, resulting 
from about 2,400 firms on average in the cross-section and 21 years of data. Summary 
statistics for the main variables are reported in table 1, panel A.  
   18
Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics  
In panel A returns are computed as monthly buy and hold returns, in panel B as cumulative returns in the 3-day window 
around the earnings data release. MV is market capitalization. COV is the number of analysts covering the stock. AGE is 
measured by the number of years that the firm has been present in the CRSP dataset. SIGMA, CVOL and DISP measure the 
volatility of weekly returns, the volatility of income, and the dispersion of analyst forecasts, in the order. See section 3 for 
details. Panel A refers to monthly observations; panel B to quarterly observations indexed to the time of earnings releases. In 
both panels the sample period is January 1985-December 2005. 
 
  No. 
obs.  Mean  Std 
Dev  Min Max  Q1  Median  Q4 
Panel A: Analyst forecasts revisions dataset (monthly frequency) 
          
Returns (%)  592,045  1.8  14.3  -84.8  937.4  -5.3  1.1  7.8 
MV ($  million) 592,045  2,995  13,147  3 602,433  170  499 1,653 
COV (n. analysts)  592,045  16.4  16.5 1.0 79.9 4.5 10.8  22.7 
AGE (years) 576,312  9.1  7.7  1.0 63.0 4.0  7.0 12.0 
SIGMA  (%)  590,336  5.7 3.0 1.1 34.5 3.6  5.0  7.1 
CVOL (%)  367,599  1.6 2.4 0.0  128.2  0.5 1.0 1.9 
DISP  (%)  427,000  0.3 9.6 0.0 4291.4 0.0  0.1  0.2 
           
Panel B: Post-earnings announcements (PEAD) dataset (quarterly frequency) 
          
Returns  (%)  201,859  0.3  7.7 -85.6  93.0 -2.9  0.0  3.6 
MV ($  million) 201,859  2,853  12,912  4 579,242  158  463 1,524 
COV (n. analysts)  201,859  16.4  16.4 1.0 79.9 4.5 10.8  22.7 
AGE (years) 196,658  8.8  7.6  1.0 63.0 3.0  6.0 12.0 
SIGMA  (%)  199,846  5.7 3.0 1.1 32.8 3.6  5.0  7.1 
CVOL (%)  125,462  1.6 2.4 0.0  105.7  0.5 1.0 1.9 
DISP (%)  161,705  0.4  14.4  0.0 4291.4 0.0  0.1  0.2 
 
The dataset used in section 5 to study the post-earnings announcement drift is similar, 
except for the following aspects. First, abnormal returns are computed using the market 
model, as described in section 5. Second, the measures of news 
j
T S  , , to be described below, 
rely on quarterly earnings releases. This yields a quarterly dataset, where all stocks 
experiencing an earnings release during a given quarter are pooled together in a single cross-
section. Accordingly, with a slight change of notation relative to the previous dataset, 
j
T T r 1 , 1    
denotes the immediate cumulative abnormal return computed over the three-day window   19
surrounding the announcement day T. The delayed return, denoted 
j
d T T r   , 2 , is computed in an 
analogous fashion over the following d days.  
The baseline definition of 
j
T S  , relies on the sign of the stock price immediate 
abnormal return: an 
j
T T r 1 , 1    greater than 0.5 percent is taken to signal a reaction to a piece of 
good news; vice-versa, stocks with 
j
T T r 1 , 1    less than -0.5 percent are assigned to the bad news 
portfolios. As an alternative measure of news we also use 
j
T S  , = (
j
T EPS  , -
j
T FOR  , )/
j
T P , where 
j
T EPS  ,  denotes the earnings per share in quarter  released on day T (source Compustat), and 
j
T FOR  ,  is the average analyst forecast, obtained as a simple average of forecasts in the 30-day 
period ending on day T-1 (source: I/B/E/S; stale quotes were discarded before computing the 
averages).
12 The uncertainty proxies are computed as illustrated above, except that now 
j
T MV / 1 , 
j
T SIGMA  and 
j
T CVOL  are computed over the month preceding the earnings release, 
while 
j
T DISP  refers to the 30-days period before day T-2. Table 1.B presents descriptive 
statistics for this dataset. The number of observations is considerably lower than that in panel 
A, reflecting the lower frequency of the data.  
Finally, the Fama-French factors, the momentum factor and the risk-free rate used in 
section 4.4 are obtained from the Fama-French database.  
4.  Uncertainty and the post-analyst forecast revisions price drift  
In this section we evaluate how rapidly stock prices adjust to analyst forecasts 
revisions. In this context, immediate returns 
j
T r  and delayed returns 
j
d T r   are computed on a 
                                                 
12  DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) note that Compustat and I/B/E/S announcement dates do not always agree, 
and that  before January 1, 1990 both sources report the Wall Street Journal publication date, which is the 
day following the earnings release. They also mention that after 1994 the quality of the dates is almost 
perfect.    20
monthly basis (T and d denote months) and 
j
T S  is the revision of the average analyst forecast 
of earnings per share for stock j in month T. Each month T, stocks with positive news (
j
T S >0) 
are sorted into 5 quintiles, based on our proxies for information uncertainty, one at the time. 
We replicate the procedure for each month in our sample, and compute relevant statistics over 
the available sample period (1985-2005). We repeat these steps for the bad news (
j
T S <0) 
group.  
Before moving to the results, we need to clarify a few methodological aspects 
characterizing this section. First, abnormal returns are computed using the widely-used 
market-adjusted model (see e.g. Brown and Warner (1985), Conrad, Cornell and Landsman 
(2002),  Chang, Cheng and Yu (2007)): we take the difference between the return of the event 
firms (those in the bad news, low uncertainty group, say) and the return of the value-weighted 
market portfolio. In subsection 4.4 we adopt a factor model. Second, we deem 
j
T r  
“immediate” returns because they are computed over the same period as 
j
T S . This choice has 
certain drawbacks. In particular, to gauge the impact of a certain event of interest on the stock 
price, the literature on event studies focuses on much narrower windows around the event 
itself, to minimize confounding factors and to avoid overlapping between periods of news and 
periods of no news. We believe our choice may be justified in the light of our primary intent 
in this section, which is to maximize the comparability of our results with previous results on 
price continuation. The robustness checks described in subsection 4.5, and the results in 
section 5, where the news considered are quarterly earnings releases, give us confidence that 
these confounding factors are not the main drivers of our findings.  
Third, our baseline results are based on stocks whose immediate reaction is in line 
with the news. Specifically, among the bad news stocks (recording downward analyst 
forecasts revision) we consider only those characterized by 
j
T r ≤0, and drop observations   21
displaying 
j
T r >0. Likewise, we drop the observations characterized by 
j
T r <0 from the good 
news groups. This exclusion is warranted by the fact that measuring price continuation and 
adjustment speed in reaction to a piece of news makes sense only if stock prices display a 
sensible reaction to the news to begin with. Observations failing to meet this condition are 
likely affected by noise, or may reflect poor quality of the proxy for news;
13 they should wash 
out when  is estimated as a ratio of means, but they might distort the estimators based on 
individual stock ratios.
14 Be that as it may, in what follows we check the robustness of our 
results to this exclusion. 
4.1   Behavior of immediate and delayed abnormal returns 
Panel A of table 2 reports average abnormal returns in the month following the 
forecast revision (
U
d T r  , d=1). Two main results emerge from the table. First, good news (an 
improvement in analyst earnings forecasts over a given month) tend to be associated with 
better-than-average stock performance in the next month; the opposite is true in the case of a 
downward revision in forecasts. Second, such continuation effect is stronger in the case of 
high uncertainty stocks. Based on e.g. the first uncertainty proxy, 1/MV, a zero-cost portfolio 
constructed with stocks in the first uncertainty quintile, taking each month a long position in 
the good news stocks and a short position in the bad news stocks, yields a return of 0.36 
percent in the following month. This compares with 2.43 percent for a similar portfolio 
constructed using stocks in the fifth uncertainty quintile.  
                                                 
13  Stocks displaying a 
j
T r  inconsistent with their 
j
T S  group are a large share of the total (40-45 percent of both 
the 
j
T S >0 or the 
j
T S <0 group). Similar figures are found for the dataset in section 5 when 
j
T S  is defined as  
actual quarterly earnings per share minus the average of forecasts formulated by analyst in the previous 
month. Loh and Stulz (2009) find that the stock price reaction to individual analysts forecast revisions is 
consistent with the sign of the revision in only one third of the cases.  
14  Suppose that following e.g. good news the price of stock j declines for unobserved reasons, and that a 
further decline is observed in the following period. Then the ratio 
j
d T r  /
j
T r , and therefore 
j  , will be 
positive, signaling price continuation, whereas the price movements have arguably little to do with the news.    22
Table 2 - Average abnormal stock returns and information uncertainty 
News: analyst forecast revisions  
 (percentage values; t statistics in italics) 
Bad and good news portfolios are constructed based on the revision of the monthly average analyst forecast. Abnormal 
returns are computed as the return of each stock minus that of the value-weighted market portfolio.  The Qs denote 
uncertainty quintiles. For each month T in the sample we partition stocks into 3 groups, depending on whether the forecast 
revision in T is positive, zero or negative. Within the positive and negative forecast revision groups we then sort stocks into 5 
quintiles, based on six proxies for information uncertainty measured in T, and compute average returns for each quintile over 
the 1985-2005 period. Panels A and B report returns in T+1; and in T, in the order. MV is market capitalization. COV is the 
number of analysts covering the stock. AGE is measured by the number of years that the firm has been present in the CRSP 
dataset. SIGMA, CVOL and DISP measure the volatility of weekly returns, the volatility of income, and the dispersion of 
analyst forecasts, in the order. See section 3 for details. The heteroskedasticity robust t statistics, in italics, are obtained by 
regressing individual stock returns on a set of ten dummy variables, one for each quintile-news pair, allowing for clustering 
within periods. We dropped stocks whose immediate abnormal return was inconsistent with the news, i.e. stocks with 
positive immediate (negative) returns for the formation of the bad (good) news portfolios. 
Panel A: Abnormal returns in the month following the negative or positive analyst forecast revision  
   Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE 
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news     Good - bad   Bad news Good news     Good - bad  Bad news Good news    Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  -0.00 0.36 0.36  1.4  0.16 0.56  0.40  1.3 0.03 0.56  0.53  2.3 
Q2  0.12 0.45  0.33  1.1  -0.13 0.49 0.62  2.0 0.13 0.92  0.79  3.0 
Q3  -0.03 0.68 0.71  2.2  -0.09 0.75 0.84  2.9 -0.15 1.09  1.24  3.9 
Q4  -0.25 1.34 1.59  5.5  -0.15 1.26 1.42  5.3 -0.10 1.12  1.22  3.9 
Q5 (high)  -0.47 1.96 2.43  9.4  -0.40 1.89 2.29  8.2 -0.55 1.14  1.68  5.4 
Q5-Q1  -0.47 1.60     -0.56 1.33     -0.58 0.57    
  -1.6 5.1     -2.2 4.5     -1.5 1.7    
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news  Good news    Good - bad   Bad news Good news   Good - bad   Bad news Good news Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  0.23 0.48  0.25  1.4  0.27 0.61  0.34  1.5 0.08 0.66  0.59  1.9 
Q2  0.13 0.66  0.53  2.3  -0.13 0.68 0.80  3.3 0.12 0.55  0.43  1.5 
Q3  -0.20 0.95 1.15  3.8  0.01 0.86  0.86  2.9 -0.02 0.57  0.59  2.1 
Q4  -0.33 1.26 1.59  4.4  0.06 0.92  0.85  2.5 -0.16 1.00  1.16  4.0 
Q5 (high)  -0.44 1.44 1.88  4.7  0.09 1.62  1.53  3.8 -0.50 1.41  1.91  5.3 
Q5-Q1  -0.67 0.96     -0.18 1.01     -0.57 0.75    
  -1.1 1.7     -0.4 2.2     -2.0 2.6    
Panel B: Abnormal returns in the month of the negative or positive analyst forecast revision  
  Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE  
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news      Good - bad   Bad news Good news     Good - bad  Bad news  Good news     Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  -6.57 7.34  13.90  35.1 -8.12 8.41  16.54  42.8 -6.96 7.50  14.46  45.2 
Q2  -8.15 9.15  17.30  41.4 -9.00 9.67  18.67  42.9 -8.28 9.41  17.69  44.4 
Q3  -9.71 10.87  20.58  46.4 -9.94 10.68  20.62  46.6 -9.84 10.86  20.70  51.2 
Q4  -11.31 12.38 23.69  55.4 -10.71 11.84 22.55  51.0 -11.11 12.47  23.58  50.2 
Q5 (high)  -12.46 13.38 25.84  64.5 -10.57 12.82 23.39  60.3 -12.26 13.19  25.45  52.9 
Q5-Q1  -5.89 6.04     -2.45 4.41     -5.30 5.69   
  -41.0 23.4     -16.4 19.3     -28.8 23.0   
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news Good news      Good - bad   Bad news Good news     Good - bad  Bad news  Good news    Good - bad 
Q1 (low)  -5.03 5.47  10.50  41.1 -6.38 6.61  13.00  41.0 -8.63 9.21  17.84  41.8 
Q2  -7.01 7.37  14.38  47.2 -7.94 8.33  16.27  45.6 -8.67 9.30  17.97  44.2 
Q3  -8.96 9.77  18.73  49.1 -8.97 9.75  18.73  49.3 -9.38 10.25  19.63  46.6 
Q4  -11.53 12.47 24.00  51.5 -9.90 11.47  21.37  52.2 -10.07 10.58  20.65  50.1 
Q5 (high)  -15.63 18.07 33.70  52.0 -11.61 13.91 25.52  56.4 -11.53 12.89  24.43  46.6 
Q5-Q1  -10.60 12.60     -5.22 7.30     -2.90 3.68   
  -42.2 27.7     -31.3 23.3     -19.1 14.3      
The results are broadly confirmed by the other proxies.
15 Overall, this evidence is 
coherent with Zhang (2006): the higher the uncertainty, the stronger the price continuation, in 
either direction.  
Panel B of table 2 reports the stock returns in the month of the analyst earning forecast 
revision, to focus on the immediate effect of the revision. If higher uncertainty leads to news 
being incorporated more slowly into stock prices, one would expect the immediate price 
reaction to be large for low uncertainty stocks, and small for high uncertainty ones. The table 
reveals quite a different story: as in panel A, the price reaction increases with uncertainty. 
According to 1/MV, the yield difference between good and bad news stocks is 13.9 percentage 
points for low uncertainty stocks, and 25.8 points for high uncertainty ones. These very large 
figures are due to our choice to eliminate observations whose immediate return is inconsistent 
with the news, discussed above.
  
This result suggests that the immediate reaction of low uncertainty stocks to news is 
relatively low, or that the news “hitting” these stocks are relatively “small”. To gather 
evidence about these two hypotheses, in figure 2 we plot the shocks 
j
T S , together with the 
immediate returns from table 2, against uncertainty (for parsimony, we take averages over the 
six uncertainty proxies). The figure clearly shows that the absolute magnitude of the shocks is 
increasing in the level of information uncertainty. The relatively high price continuation for 
the stocks of high uncertainty firms, also documented in previous literature, may be 
exclusively due to the fact that these stocks are subject to larger shocks. This finding is quite 
intuitive, as some of the uncertainty proxies, e.g. SIGMA (the standard deviation of weekly 
stock returns) should be clearly proportional to the “size” of the news. 
                                                 
15  Similar patterns are obtained if table 2 is replicated with the full dataset, i.e. without dropping the 
observations whose immediate reaction is inconsistent with the news (see table A.1 in the appendix). In this 
case the returns from the good minus bad strategy are positive and significant for all uncertainty quintiles. 
The tables were also replicated with absolute returns, with qualitatively unchanged results (not reported).   24
Fig. 2 - Immediate abnormal stock returns and analyst forecasts revisions  
of quarterly earnings vs. information uncertainty 
(percentage values) 
The horizontal axis measures uncertainty quintiles, from low (Q1) to high (Q5). The curves of immediate returns are obtained 
as averages of the percentage abnormal returns reported in table 2, equally weighted across the six uncertainty proxies. The 
curves for analyst forecasts revisions are obtained in a similar fashion. The revisions are computed as the average forecast for 
















Immediate returns in reaction to positive analysts forecasts 
Immediate returns in reaction to negative analysts forecasts 
Positive analysts forecasts revisions  (right axis)
Negative analysts forecasts revisions (right axis)
 
 
4.2   Assessing stock price sluggishness  
Estimates of our measures of stock price sluggishness (1) through (4) are reported in 
panels A through D of table 3, in the order. For reasons which we shall discuss in the next 
subsection, let us begin by considering panel B, reporting the share of stocks displaying price 
continuation in the month following the release of the news. As argued in section 2, if the 
adjustment to the news is immediate the stock price should adjust downwards (upwards) 
following bad (good) news, but in the next period the likelihood of an upward movement 
should be the same as that of a downward movement, i.e. 50 percent. By contrast, in the 
presence of underreaction the share of observations displaying price continuation should be 
larger than 50 percent. 
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Table 3 - Stock price sluggishness and information uncertainty  
News: analyst forecast revisions 
(percentage values; t statistics in italics) 
Bad and good news portfolios are constructed based on the revision of the monthly average analyst forecast. The Qs denote 
uncertainty quintiles, computed from independent sortings of the six proxies reported in the table (see section 3 and the note 
to table 2 for their definition and construction methodology). The 
U measure the ratio between delayed and immediate stock 
returns; 
U=0 corresponds to immediate price adjustment, positive values to sluggish adjustment, negative values to price 
reversal. The estimates in panel A are computed as the ratio between the delayed and the immediate returns from table 2. 
Heteroskedasticity robust t statistics are obtained via a weighted regression of single stock ratios on four portfolio dummies 
(high vs. low uncertainty, good vs. bad news), allowing for clustering at the date level. The weighting ensures that the 
regression coefficients equal the 
U. The shares in panel B are computed as a mean of monthly shares in each of the four 
portfolios. Quarterly shares are computed as the number of stocks whose return in T+1 has the same sign as in T, divided by 
the total number of stocks in the portfolio. Heteroskedasticity robust t statistics test the null hypothesis that the shares differ 
from 50, or across the four portfolios. They are derived from a time series regression of the monthly shares on four portfolio 
dummies. The ratio of medians is computed as the average of monthly ratios of medians, via a similar regression. The t 
statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity. The median of ratios is obtained via a quintile regression of single stock ratios on 
four portfolio dummies. We dropped stocks whose immediate abnormal return was inconsistent with the news, i.e. stocks 
with positive immediate (negative) returns for the formation of the bad (good) news portfolios. 
Panel A: 
U   estimated  as ratio between delayed and immediate mean abnormal returns 
  Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE  
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news   Good - bad   Bad news  Good news Good - bad    Bad news  Good news    Good - bad
Q1 (low)  0.05 4.89 4.84 -1.93 6.68  8.61 -0.46 7.49  7.95 
  0.0 2.3 1.8 -0.7  3.2 2.4 -0.1 3.1  1.7 
Q5 (high)  3.81 14.66 10.85  3.81 14.76 10.95 4.47 8.61 4.14 
  1.5 6.9 2.6  1.4 7.0  2.7 1.5 4.0 0.9 
Q5-Q1  3.76 9.77    5.75 8.09    4.93 1.12   
  1.4 3.4    2.1 3.0    1.3 0.4   
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news  Good news   Good - bad   Bad news  Good news Good - bad   Bad news  Good news  Good - bad 
Q1 (low)  -4.56 8.77 13.33 -4.21 9.24 13.45 -0.87 7.18  8.06 
  -1.1 2.3  1.8  -1.2 2.8  2.3 -0.3 3.3  2.1 
Q5 (high)  2.81 7.99 5.18 -0.77 11.62 12.39  4.29 10.94 6.65 
  0.8 3.3 1.0 -0.2 4.5  2.4  1.5 4.7 1.5 
Q5-Q1  7.37 -0.78    3.44 2.38    5.17 3.76   
  1.2 -0.1    0.7 0.5    1.9 1.5   
Panel B: Share of stocks displaying price continuation 
   Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE 
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news   Good - bad   Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news   Good - bad 
Q1 (low)  50.46 50.67  0.21  50.12 50.83  0.70  50.99 51.02  0.03 
  0.6 0.8 0.2  0.2 1.1 0.5 1.2 1.2 0.0 
Q5 (high)  54.42 50.72  -3.69  53.60 50.28  -3.32  53.28 49.58  -3.70 
  5.3 0.8 -3.1 4.3 0.3 -2.9 4.1 -0.5 -3.2 
Q5-Q1  3.96 0.06    3.48 -0.55    2.29 -1.44   
  3.6 0.0    3.1  -0.4    2.0 -1.2   
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news  Good news    Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news    Good - bad 
Q1 (low)  49.84 51.38  1.54  48.67 51.76  3.08  50.01 51.05  1.04 
  -0.2 1.3  1.1  -1.4 1.5  2.1  0.0  1.3  0.8 
Q5 (high)  54.50 49.06  -5.44  53.47 51.40  -2.07  53.15 49.92  -3.23 
  4.4 -0.9 -3.7  3.6 1.3 -1.4 3.4 -0.1 -2.6 
Q5-Q1  4.66 -2.32    4.80 -0.36    3.14 -1.13   
  3.4 -1.6    3.5 -0.2    2.7 -0.9    26
(Table 3 contd.) 
Panel C: 
U   estimated as ratio between delayed and immediate median abnormal returns 
   Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE   
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad   Bad news  Good news  Good - bad   Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  2.65 3.80 1.15  1.94 4.76  2.82    5.20 3.58 -1.62 
  1.1 1.2 0.3  0.7 1.8 0.7    1.8 1.2 -0.4 
Q5 (high)  12.93 -0.40 -13.33  12.92 2.44  -10.48    10.55 1.17  -9.39 
  4.5 -0.1 -3.0  4.4 0.7  -2.3    3.4 0.4 -2.2 
Q5-Q1  10.28 -4.20    10.97 -2.33     5.35 -2.41 
  2.7 -0.9    2.7 -0.5     1.3 -0.6   
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP   
  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad   Bad news  Good news  Good - bad   Bad news  Good news   Good - bad    
Q1 (low)  -0.03 5.67  5.70  -3.46 2.58 6.04    0.46 3.72 3.26 
  0.0 1.2 1.0  -1.0 0.5 1.0    0.2 1.1  0.8 
Q5 (high)  12.30 -1.66 -13.96  10.31 3.32 -6.99    10.29 1.49  -8.81 
  3.8 -0.6 -3.2  2.6 0.9  -1.3    2.9 0.5 -1.8 
Q5-Q1  12.33 -7.33    13.77 0.74     9.83 -2.24   
  2.6 -1.3    2.6 0.1     2.2 -0.5   
Panel D: 
U   estimated as median of ratios between delayed and immediate abnormal returns  
  Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE 
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad   Bad news  Good news  Good - bad   Bad news  Good news   Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  1.98 2.86 0.88  0.63 3.21  2.58    3.25 2.92 -0.33   
  1.9 1.1 0.5  0.6 1.2 1.5    3.2 1.1 -0.2   
Q5 (high)  11.36 6.01  -5.34  9.98 7.14  -2.84    9.06 2.63 -6.43   
  8.5 2.3 -3.2  6.6 2.5  -1.5    6.5 1.0 -3.7   
Q5-Q1  9.38 3.16    9.34 3.93     5.81 -0.28   
  6.5 1.7    5.9 1.9     3.9 -0.1   
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad   Bad news  Good news  Good - bad   Bad news  Good news   Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  -0.19 4.76  4.95  -2.82 6.89 9.71    2.03 2.86 0.83   
  -0.2 1.8  3.0  -2.4 2.3 5.1    2.0  1.1  0.5   
Q5 (high)  11.22 0.96 -10.25  8.86 3.78  -5.08    10.27 3.14  -7.14   
  8.6 0.4 -6.2  5.9 1.2  -2.7    7.9 1.2 -4.4   
Q5-Q1  11.40 -3.80    11.68 -3.11     8.24 0.27   
  8.1 -2.1    7.0 -1.5     5.8 0.2     
 
 
Consider first the bad news groups. The shares for the low uncertainty stocks are 
slightly lower or higher than 50, depending on the proxy considered, but never statistically 
different from this value. By contrast, for the high uncertainty groups the percentage is 
significantly larger than 50 for all proxies considered. Furthermore, the difference between 
the high and low uncertainty shares is consistently positive and statistically significant, as can 
be seen from the difference reported in the rows labeled “Q5-Q1”. Therefore, for the bad  27
news stocks there is evidence that the adjustment speed is higher among high uncertainty 
stocks.  
For the good news groups the table reveals rather different patterns. The percentage of 
stocks whose price displays continuation is never statistically different from 50 for either the 
low and high uncertainty stocks. The difference high-minus-low is negative in five out of six 
cases, and it is never significant, suggesting that in the case of good news the adjustment 
speed is equal across low and high uncertainty stocks. The evidence in panel B is closely 
matched by the two estimators of  in panels C and D (the ratio of the median values of 
j
T r 1   
and 
j
T r , the median value of the ratios computed at the individual stock level).  
Summing up, the median-based estimators (2) through (4) strongly suggest that high 
uncertainty stocks display relatively more sluggish price adjustment than low uncertainty ones 
in reaction to bad news, whereas the adjustment speed is similar in the case of good news.  
4.3   Median- vs. mean-based estimators  
Consider now the mean-based estimator of , in panel A of table 3 (recall that these 
estimates are equal by construction to the ratio between delayed and immediate mean returns 
from table 2). For the bad news group, the estimated ρ
H are positive for all 6 proxies, whereas 
the ρ
L  are zero or negative; however, none of them are statistically different from zero. The 
null hypothesis ρ
H = ρ
L is rejected in favor of the alternative ρ
H > ρ
L by one out of six 
uncertainty proxies (1/COV). For the good news group, both ρ
H and ρ
L  are significantly 
greater than zero for all six proxies. In this case, the null hypothesis ρ
H = ρ
L  is rejected by 
1/MV and 1/COV.  
This evidence differs rather sharply from that emerging from the previous sub-section. 
As discussed in section 2, this apparent contrast is due to the asymmetric distribution of 
j
d T r  .  28
Consider e.g. the high uncertainty, bad news portfolio for CVOL. The estimated ratio of 
means (-0.8), together with the estimated share (53.5), suggest that the distribution is skewed 
to the right: more than 50 percent of the stocks record relatively modest price continuation, 
whereas a relatively small fraction displays relatively strong reversal. This raises the question 
of what is the right measure of adjustment speed. To the extent that, when discussing high vs. 
low uncertainty stocks, one has in mind a “representative” stock for each category, we believe 
that the median-based estimators should be preferred, as they are less influenced by extreme 
observations.  
This difference between mean- and median-based estimators of adjustment speed is 
important because most empirical work on stock price continuation patterns focuses on mean 
returns. Our evidence suggests that, depending on the purpose of the analysis, alternative 
estimators could be preferred. 
4.4 Four-factor model results 
In this subsection we adopt the factor model approach proposed by Fama and French 
(1996) to obtain alternative measures of immediate and delayed returns. The idea is to 
eliminate the portion of returns predictability that can be attributed to rational causes, e.g. 
risk. For each of our four portfolios of stocks (low vs. high uncertainty, bad vs. good news) 
we compute the average absolute return in the month of the portfolio formation and in the 
following month, denoted 
U
T R  and 
U
T R 1  , respectively. We replicate this procedure for each 
month in our sample, and obtain monthly time series of returns for each portfolio. We adopt 
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where the superscripts U = H, L denote high and low uncertainty, as usual (superscripts N = B, 
G have been omitted); 
M
T r  is the market return, computed from the value-weighted CRSP 
index;  fT r  is the risk-free rate; SMB (the size premium) and HML (the value premium) are the 
other two Fama-French factors; and UMD captures momentum. The coefficients 
U
I   and 
U
D   
measure the immediate and the delayed reaction to the news, net of the effect captured by the 




I   for each portfolio (p-values are not available).  
The results are in table 4.
  Consider the bad news portfolios first. The estimates of  I    
are all significant and negative, and the 
H
I  are roughly twice the size of the 
L
I  , in line with 
the evidence in table 2, panel A. The estimated  D   for the low uncertainty portfolios are all 
positive, and statistically significant in three out of six cases, suggesting that the adjustment is 
immediate or that there is reversal. For the high uncertainty portfolios the estimated  D   are 
instead negative in five out of six cases, and significant in two. The overall pattern for bad 
news is similar to the one in table 2, panel B. The ratios suggest that ρ
H > ρ
L holds in the case 
of bad news.  
For the positive forecast revisions, in panel B, all the 
L
D   are positive, and four out of 
six are significantly greater than zero. All the 
H
D   are positive and statistically significant. 
Based on the point estimates of the ratios, the inequality ρ
H > ρ
L holds for five out of six 
proxies, but for three of them the s have a rather similar magnitude. Overall, the message 
emerging from table 3 seems little changed.
16 
 
                                                 
16    For robustness, we recomputed table 4 over the full dataset, i.e. without dropping observations whose 
immediate reaction is in line with the news. The evidence against the null hypothesis ρ
H = ρ
L weakens 
further (results not reported).  30
Table 4 - Four factor model results 
News: analyst forecast revisions 
(percentage values; t statistics in italics) 
The table reports the parameters  i
I   and  i
D  , the intercepts computed from equations (5) in the text, as well as estimates of 

U, computed as  i
I  / i
D  . The Qs denote uncertainty quintiles, computed from independent sortings of the six proxies reported 
in the column headings of the table (see section 3 and the note to table 2 for their definition and construction methodology). 
The t statistics, in italics, are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
Sorted by:  1/MV  1/COV   1/AGE  SIGMA   CVOL   DISP 
Panel A: Bad news (negative forecast revisions)     
Uncertainty  Immediate returns (
U
I  )  
Q1 (low)  -6.0    -7.4 -6.4 -4.7 -6.0 -7.7 
  -36.9  -38.6 -45.3 -44.4 -40.6 -37.5 
Q5 (high)  -11.5  -9.8  -11.2 -14.2 -10.7 -10.3 
  57.9  -54.7 -45.0 -44.2 -49.2 -46.5 
  Delayed returns (
U
D  ) 
Q1 (low)  0.1    0.4 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 
  0.8  2.4 0.6 2.6 1.7 2.0 
Q5 (high)  -0.4  -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 0.1 -0.4 
  -1.7  -1.8 -2.3 -3.3 0.6 -1.9 
  Ratio between delayed and immediate mean abnormal return (
U) 
Q1 (low)  -1.6  -5.0 -1.1 -6.3 -4.6 -4.7 
Q5 (high)  3.2  3.6 3.5 2.1 -1.3 3.6 
         
Panel B: Good news (positive forecast revisions)     
Uncertainty  Immediate returns (
U
I  ) 
Q1 (low)  6.9    7.9 7.0 5.1 6.1 8.4 
  27.6  32.9 33.5 37.6 37.5 32.5 
Q5 (high)  12.4  11.7 12.5 16.8 12.9 11.8 
  39.1  41.2 35.7 33.8 37.7 24.7 
  Delayed returns (
U
D  ) 
Q1 (low)  0.2    0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.5 
  1.5  2.3 2.4 2.5 1.2 2.9 
Q5 (high)  1.4  1.1 0.8 1.1 1.2 0.8 
  6.6  5.5 3.7 4.5 4.2 3.1 
  Ratio between delayed and immediate mean abnormal return (
U) 
Q1 (low)  3.2  4.8 4.9 6.5 3.6 5.8 
Q5 (high)  11.5 9.5 6.2 6.3 9.3 6.5 
 
4.5  Robustness 
The above results proved robust to a series of alternative assumptions and 
methodological choices, which we summarize in what follows. One obvious candidate  31
explanation for the difference in pattern across the good and bad news portfolios is the 
method chosen to assign stocks to these groups, based on analyst forecasts revisions. In 
particular, analyst forecasts may suffer from biases (see e.g. Trueman (1994); Jackson and 
Johnson (2006)). Thus, we replicate the key steps of the analysis with an alternative definition 
of 
j
T S  , . Specifically, stocks were assigned to the good and bad news groups based on 
whether their immediate return 
j
T r  exceeded 0.5 percent or was below -0.5 percent in the 
month with a non-zero average forecasts revision. In so doing, we use all observations, i.e. we 
do not discard observations whose immediate reaction is inconsistent with the sign of the 
news, as we do to obtain our baseline results. This definition of news is analogous to the one 
we adopt in section 5. The results are in table A.2 in the appendix. The patterns on stock price 
sluggishness documented in the previous subsection come out strengthened. Specifically, our 
median-based estimators now strongly suggest that price adjustment of high uncertainty 
stocks is relatively slow following bad news, but relatively fast following good news.
17  
Several other checks confirmed the results of the previous sub-sections (results not 
reported). First, our measure of immediate returns, 
j
T r , may be biased as it may incorporate a 
delayed effect of last month’s analyst forecast revision, 
j
T S 1  ; similarly, 
j
T r 1   may also 
incorporate the immediate effect of 
j
t S 1  . This problem may be particularly relevant if there is 
significant autocorrelation in 
j
T S . To make sure that our results are not driven by this effect 
we restrict the analysis to those stocks for which the conditions 
j
T S 1  = 0, 
j
T S ≠ 0 and 
j
t S 1  = 0 
hold. Second, we tried to control for the quarterly release of earnings data. Once in each 
                                                 
17  Results were also replicated using a zero threshold for immediate returns (instead of the plus/minus 0.5 
percent threshold) to define the bad or good news groups. This robustness check controls for the following 
potential source of bias. Suppose that the immediate return is given by the genuine reaction to the surprise 
plus a zero mean random noise. Then stocks with relatively low price adjustment speed, i.e. with relatively 
small immediate reaction, would be more likely do be dropped under our baseline methodology.   32
quarter, monthly returns are affected not only by 
j
T S , but also by the actual release of 
earnings data. This may have an important effect on returns, independent of the effect of 
j
T S . 
As a crude but straightforward way to control for this effect, we restricted the sample to the 
months not affected by the release of the quarterly earnings. Third, our results were replicated 
over the two sub-samples 1985-1995 and 1996-2005. Fourth, in the light of evidence 
suggesting that the delayed effect of news can last for several months (e.g. Zhang (2006)), we 
experimented with different definitions of delayed returns. Specifically, we redefined 
j
d t r  as 
the return in the two, three, six and twelve months following the release. Fifth, we pooled 
stocks in the first and second uncertainty quintiles, and analyzed their behavior vis-à-vis 
stocks in the fourth and fifth uncertainty quintiles. Finally, one could argue that small absolute 
values of 
j
T S  incorporate an excessive amount of noise, and could therefore reduce the 
precision of the estimates. Thus, we attributed observations with small absolute values of 
j
T S  
to the 
j
T S = 0 group. We experimented with various definitions of “small”, so as to 
significantly reduce the number of observations in the good and bad news groups. 
5.  Uncertainty and the post-earnings announcement drift 
A large literature, at which we briefly hinted in the introduction, has documented the 
post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD), the fact that stock prices continue to drift in the 
direction of the earnings surprise in the days or weeks following the earnings release. The 
anomaly is often attributed to investors’ slow response to new information.  
Therefore, in this section we look at stock prices adjustment speed using data on stock 
returns around and after the announcement of quarterly earnings. This second set of exercises 
allows us to overcome several difficulties that in principle could mar the evidence discussed  33
thus far. In essence, the arrival of the news, and therefore the immediate and the delayed stock 
price reaction to them, should now be measured with higher precision.  
Stocks in each cross-section are first separated into good and bad news groups; each 
group is then sorted in increasing order of uncertainty, based on our usual proxies. The 
analysis is then conducted on the bad vs. good news, low vs. high uncertainty portfolios. 
While the analysis is similar to that of the previous section, the following differences are 
worth highlighting. 
First, focusing on actual earnings releases yields four observations for each year and 
firm. Now subscripts measure days, and T denotes the day of the actual earnings release; the 
immediate and delayed cumulative abnormal returns are denoted by 
j
T T r 1 , 1    and 
j
d T T r   , 2 , 
respectively. Our baseline results are derived using d=30 calendar days (alternative choices 
are discussed in section 5.3, devoted to the robustness checks).  
Second, our baseline proxy for news is now based on positive and negative excess 
returns on the day of the earnings release (see e.g. Frazzini (2006); in the notation of section 




T T r 1 , 1   ). Specifically, the good (bad) news portfolios comprise stocks whose 
j
T T r 1 , 1    exceeds 0.5 percent (is below -0.5 percent). This allows us to completely disregard 
analyst forecasts, avoiding the potential problems discussed in section 4.4. However, we also 
replicate the analysis with an alternative definition of news, i.e. earnings surprises, computed 
as actual announcements of quarterly earnings minus the average of analyst forecasts recorded 
in the previous month. The related results are discussed in section 5.3. 
Third, abnormal returns are computed using the market model, which is widely used in 
the event studies literature (in section 5.3 we also use returns in deviation from the market, as 
in section 4). We proceed as follows. For each stock and earnings announcement date T, we  34
estimate the following regression over the 60 calendar days period before each   
announcement:  






s r R       1 0 ,           s = T-60, T-59, …. T-2, 
where 
j
s R  denotes the absolute return of stock j and 
M
s r is the market return, computed using 
the value-weighted index.
18 Immediate and delayed abnormal returns are then defined as 
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d T T r
2
, 2 ) ˆ 1 (  , where hats denote the residuals obtained 
from equation (6). 
We deviate from the typical PEAD analysis in several respects. First, in this literature, 
news are generally computed as standardized unexpected earnings (current minus past quarter 
earnings, normalized by the standard deviation of earnings). Furthermore, abnormal returns 
are often computed as in section 4 (i.e. in deviation from the market return) or with matched 
portfolios (e.g. by size, book-to-market value; see Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990), Hou 
and Moskowitz (2005)). Since we want a genuine measure of the (immediate and delayed) 
stock price reaction to the earnings surprise, we need to eliminate from the returns the part 
which can be predicted based on information available prior to the release. This includes a 
possible positive or negative drift – the coefficient 
j
0   in equation (6) – which may be present 
the days or weeks prior to the announcement (see Bernard and Thomas (1989)).  
5.1  Behavior of immediate and delayed returns 
Table 5 – the analogue of table 2 – shows average immediate and delayed abnormal 
returns for each proxy-quintile-news portfolio. Consider the delayed returns, in Panel A.  
                                                 
18  Additional factors could be introduced in equation (6), but there is evidence that doing so would add little 
explanatory power to the market model (see Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997)).  35
Table 5 - Average abnormal stock returns and information uncertainty 
News: quarterly earnings announcements 
(percentage values; t statistics in italics) 
Bad and good news portfolios are constructed based on  the  sign of the return on the day of the quarterly earnings 
announcement,  j
T T r 1 , 1    (the immediate return). Specifically, the good (bad) news portfolios comprise stocks whose  j
T T r 1 , 1    
exceeds 0.5 percent (is below -0.5 percent). The Qs denote uncertainty quintiles, computed from independent sortings of the 
six proxies reported in the table (see section 3 and the note to table 2 for their definition and construction methodology). 
Abnormal returns are computed using the market model, as described in section 5. The heteroskedasticity robust t statistics, 
in italics, are obtained by regressing individual stock returns on a set of ten dummy variables, one for each quintile-news pair, 
allowing for clustering at the date level.  
Panel A: Abnormal returns in the month following the 3-day window around negative or positive earnings surprises  
   Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE 
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news     Good - bad   Bad news  Good news    Good - bad   Bad news  Good news     Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  -1.57 0.91 2.48  14.3  -1.01 1.76  2.77  14.8  -0.97 1.82  2.80  16.7 
Q2  -2.30 1.05 3.35  16.3  -1.54 1.86  3.41  15.5  -1.80 1.72  3.52  16.7 
Q3  -2.42 1.59 4.01  19.6  -1.95 1.75  3.70  14.5  -2.03 1.36  3.39  16.0 
Q4  -2.28 1.76 4.04  13.4  -2.80 1.20  4.00  19.0  -2.65 1.47  4.13  19.0 
Q5 (high)  -2.04 2.22 4.26  18.2  -3.59 0.92  4.52  15.3  -3.24 1.13  4.37  16.1 
Q5-Q1  -0.47 1.31     -2.58 -0.84     -2.26 -0.69    
  -1.1 2.9     -7.6 -2.5     -5.0 -1.5    
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news  Good news      Good - bad   Bad news  Good news    Good - bad   Bad news  Good news     Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  -0.67 1.57 2.25  14.2  -1.02 1.41  2.42  13.7  -2.09 1.35  3.44  15.8 
Q2  -1.20 1.53 2.73  20.6  -1.42 1.69  3.11  16.3  -1.54 1.39  2.93  14.0 
Q3  -1.82 1.68 3.50  19.4  -1.76 1.94  3.70  16.3  -1.77 1.64  3.41  13.8 
Q4  -2.58 1.51 4.09  16.1  -1.85 1.76  3.60  17.4  -1.83 1.67  3.50  16.0 
Q5 (high)  -4.19 1.25 5.44  15.8  -3.21 1.23  4.44  13.6  -2.11 2.06  4.16  14.1 
Q5-Q1  -3.51 -0.32     -2.19 -0.18     -0.01 0.71    
  -5.8 -0.6     -4.8 -0.5     0.0 2.5    
Panel B: Abnormal returns in the 3-day window around negative or positive earnings surprises  
  Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE  
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news      Good - bad   Bad news  Good news     Good - bad   Bad news  Good news     Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  -4.14 4.28 8.41  31.6  -4.82 5.13  9.95  33.9  -3.84 4.17  8.01  38.7 
Q2  -5.04 5.12  10.16  34.8  -5.42 5.52  10.94  36.6  -4.87 5.05  9.92  40.3 
Q3  -5.74 5.76  11.49  39.3  -5.73 5.92  11.65  41.4  -5.56 5.77  11.33  43.2 
Q4  -6.08 6.19  12.28  47.7  -5.65 5.75  11.40  51.5  -6.27 6.37  12.64  45.9 
Q5 (high)  -6.17 6.61  12.78  69.7  -5.49 5.62  11.11  60.3  -6.74 6.72  13.46  45.3 
Q5-Q1  -2.03 2.33     -0.67 0.49     -2.90 2.54    
  -19.2 23.8     -5.4 5.1     -29.9 27.1    
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news  Good news      Good - bad   Bad news  Good news    Good - bad   Bad news  Good news    Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  -2.96 3.22 6.18  41.8  -3.39 3.62  7.01  43.6  -5.49 5.53  11.02  35.6 
Q2  -4.00 4.29 8.30  47.9  -4.25 4.55  8.80  43.3  -5.24 5.44  10.69  39.0 
Q3  -5.23 5.34  10.57  42.8  -5.03 5.36  10.39  44.0  -5.32 5.47  10.79  37.9 
Q4  -6.63 6.75  13.38  43.4  -5.71 6.01  11.72  44.1  -5.37 5.67  11.04  43.1 
Q5 (high)  -8.24 8.30  16.54  41.1  -6.92 7.00  13.92  48.8  -5.88 6.00  11.88  42.3 
Q5-Q1  -5.28 5.08     -3.53 3.38     -0.38 0.48    
  -32.3 33.4     -28.5 35.5     -4.7 5.1    
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There is evidence of price continuation for both bad and good news portfolios. In the 
month following the release of negative earnings surprises (captured by negative immediate 
returns), the high-minus-low uncertainty difference is positive and significant in four out of 
six cases, signaling that price continuation is stronger for high uncertainty stocks; for the 
remaining two proxies (1/MV and DISP) the difference is not significant. Within the good 
news portfolios, the high-minus-low uncertainty difference is instead negative in four out of 
six cases (significant in one), positive and significant in two cases (1/MV and DISP). 
The absolute value of the immediate returns 
j
T T r 1 , 1   , in panel B, is increasing in 
uncertainty, confirming the pattern documented in table 2.  
 
Fig. 3 - Immediate abnormal stock returns and analyst forecast errors  
of quarterly earnings vs. information uncertainty 
(percentage values) 
The horizontal axis measures uncertainty quintiles, from low (Q1) to high (Q5). The curves of immediate returns are obtained 
as averages of the percentage abnormal returns reported in table A.3 in the appendix, equally weighted across the six 
uncertainty proxies. The curves of analyst forecast errors are obtained in a similar fashion. Forecast errors are computed as 
actual announcements of quarterly earnings minus the average of analyst forecasts recorded in the previous month, 




















Immediate returns in reaction to positive forecast errors
Positive analysts forecast errors (right axis)
Negative analysts forecast errors (right axis)
Immediate returns in reaction to negative forecast errors
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To assess whether this pattern can be due to “larger” news we use our alternative 
measure of news, analyst forecast errors. Figure 3 plots these errors, together with average 
returns, against uncertainty: higher uncertainty is associated with larger errors, which cause a 
larger immediate reaction, in line with the results of the previous section.  
5.2  Assessing stock prices sluggishness  
Table 6 – the analogue of table 3 – reports our usual statistics. As before, we consider 
first the share of stocks displaying price continuation, in panel B. Among the bad news 
portfolios, the share is significantly larger than 50 percent for both the high and low 
uncertainty stocks; the difference between the former and the latter is significant and positive 
for four proxies, 1/COV, 1/AGE, SIGMA and CVOL, not significant for 1/MV and DISP. 
Considering the good news portfolios, the share is always statistically greater than 50 among 
the low uncertainty stocks, and mostly not different from 50 among the high uncertainty 
stocks. The difference high-minus-low uncertainty is negative in all cases and significant in 
four out of six.  
The median-based estimators, in panels C and D, strengthen somewhat the message 
emerging from the shares: among the bad news groups, the estimated ρs for the high 
uncertainty portfolios are almost always significantly larger than for the low uncertainty ones. 
For the good news group, both estimators suggest that the adjustment is significantly faster 
for high uncertainty stocks (ρ
H < ρ
L) when uncertainty is proxied by 1/COV, 1/AGE, SIGMA 
and CVOL ; based on 1/MV and DISP the adjustment speed is instead the same.   
Finally, the ρs estimated as a ratio of means, in panel A, broadly confirm the evidence 
from panels B through D, suggesting that the asymmetry of the distribution of delayed returns 
detected and discussed in section 4.3 is not so strong in this dataset.   
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Table 6 - Stock price sluggishness and information uncertainty  
News: quarterly earnings announcements  
(percentage values; t statistics in italics) 
Bad and good news portfolios are constructed based on  the  sign of the return on the day of the quarterly earnings 
announcement (the immediate return,  j
T T r 1 , 1   ). Specifically, the good (bad) news portfolios comprise stocks whose  j
T T r 1 , 1    
exceeds 0.5 percent (is below -0.5 percent). The Qs denote uncertainty quintiles, computed from independent sortings of the 
six proxies reported in the table (see the note to table 2 and section 3 for their definition and construction methodology). The 

U  measure the ratio between delayed and immediate stock returns; 
U=0 corresponds to immediate price adjustment, 
positive values to sluggish adjustment, negative values to price reversal. The estimates in panel A are computed as the ratio 
between the delayed and the immediate returns from table 5. The related heteroskedasticity robust t statistics are obtained via 
a weighted regression of single stock ratios on four portfolio dummies (high vs. low uncertainty, good vs. bad news), 
allowing for clustering at the date level. The weighting ensures that the regression coefficients equal the 
U. The shares in 
panel B are computed as a mean of quarterly shares in each of the four portfolios. Quarterly shares are computed as the 
number of stocks whose return in T+1 has the same sign as in T, divided by the total number of stocks in the portfolio. The 
heteroskedasticity robust t statistics test the null hypothesis that the shares differ from 50, or across the four portfolios. They 
are derived from a time series regression of the quarterly shares on four portfolio dummies. The ratio of medians is computed 
as the average of quarterly ratios of medians, via a similar regression. The t statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity. The 
median of ratios is obtained via a quantile regression of single stock ratios on four portfolio dummies. 
Panel A: 
U  estimated as a ratio between delayed and immediate mean abnormal returns 
  Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE  
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad 
Q1 (low)  38.02 21.32  -16.70    20.97 34.29 13.32  25.37 43.74 18.38 
  10.3 8.7 -3.3   5.1  11.1  2.1  5.2 10.6 2.2   
Q5 (high)  33.13 33.59 0.46    65.44 16.42  -49.02  48.01 16.84  -31.17 
  4.4 4.9  0.0   8.6 2.5  -3.7  6.7 2.4  -2.2  
Q5-Q1  -4.90 12.27     44.46 -17.87    22.65 -26.90    
  -0.7 1.8     7.2 -2.9    3.3 -3.6    
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad 
Q1 (low)  22.72 48.83  26.11    29.98 38.88 8.90  38.10 24.39  -13.71 
  4.3 10.7  3.0   5.1  7.0  0.9  7.3 5.1  -1.5   
Q5 (high)  50.80 15.10  -35.70    46.36 17.61  -28.75  35.83 34.26 -1.56 
  7.0 2.3  -2.7   7.2 3.4  -2.7  5.0 5.3  -0.1  
Q5-Q1  28.08 -33.73     16.38 -21.27    -2.28 9.87    
  3.5 -4.5     2.2 -3.3    -0.4 2.1    
Panel B: Share of stocks displaying price continuation 
   Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE 
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad 
Q1 (low)  58.41 53.47 -4.94    56.00 54.35 -1.65  56.37 55.30 -1.07   
  14.2 4.3 -4.9   9.8  6.4  -1.8  8.7 7.8  -1.1   
Q5 (high)  58.21 52.56 -5.66    62.50 50.39  -12.10  60.63 50.36  -10.27   
  9.1 2.5  -4.2  14.1 0.4 -9.1  11.0 0.4 -7.5  
Q5-Q1  -0.20 -0.92     6.50 -3.95    4.27 -4.94   
  -0.2 -0.7     6.0 -3.3    3.5 -4.2   
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad 
Q1 (low)  55.72 56.27 0.55    56.74 54.92 -1.82  58.62 52.94 -5.67   
  6.3 7.9  0.5   7.1  4.5  -1.2  12.3 3.6 -5.3   
Q5 (high)  61.78 48.84  -12.94    60.32 50.58 -9.74  58.44 52.71 -5.74   
  13.1 -1.3  -10.1   9.9 0.6  -6.6  9.3 3.0  -4.5  
Q5-Q1  6.06 -7.43     3.58 -4.34    -0.18 -0.24   
  4.7 -6.2     2.5 -2.8    -0.2 -0.2    39
   (Table 6 contd.) 
 Panel C: 
U   estimated as ratio between delayed and immediate median abnormal returns 
   Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE 
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news Good - bad  Bad news  Good news Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  61.72 19.58  -42.13  44.81 26.93 -17.88 50.88 35.84  -15.04 
  14.0 4.7 -7.0  9.4 6.3 -2.8  8.5 7.0  -1.9 
Q5 (high)  62.51 16.78  -45.73  95.97 3.98 -91.98  76.63 0.58  -76.05 
  8.8 2.0  -4.2  13.3 0.5 -8.4  10.5 0.1 -7.6 
Q5-Q1  0.79 -2.80    51.16 -22.94    25.75 -35.26   
  0.1 -0.3    5.9 -2.5    2.7 -4.1   
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad Bad news  Good news Good - bad Bad news  Good news  Good - bad 
Q1 (low)  43.09 42.98 -0.11  55.43 35.97 -19.45 62.11 16.63  -45.48 
  6.8 7.4 0.0  6.7 4.1 -1.6  11.7 2.9 -5.9 
Q5 (high)  89.62 -13.08  -102.70  74.21 -2.14 -76.35  66.42 20.38  -46.04 
  12.3 -1.9  -10.2  9.6 -0.3 -7.5  8.7 2.8  -4.4 
Q5-Q1  46.53 -56.07    18.78 -38.11    4.31 3.75   
  4.8 -6.2    1.7 -3.5    0.5 0.4   
 Panel D: 
U   estimated as median of ratios between delayed and immediate abnormal returns 
  Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE 
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  48.89 16.70  -32.20  35.46 20.51 -14.95 41.10 31.04  -10.06 
  23.8 3.3  -11.1  17.2 3.9 -5.1  19.4 5.9 -3.4 
Q5 (high)  57.86 14.66  -43.19  80.78 2.50 -78.28  71.39 1.59  -69.80 
  28.0 2.9  -14.8  32.2 0.5 -21.8  32.3 0.3  -22.4 
Q5-Q1  8.97 -2.03    45.33 -18.01    30.29 -29.45   
  3.1 -0.7    13.8 -5.5    9.9 -9.6   
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad Bad news  Good news Good - bad Bad news  Good news  Good - bad 
Q1 (low)  35.23 34.83 -0.39  41.16 28.85 -12.31 51.53 14.44  -37.10 
  16.8 6.8 -0.1  13.9 4.0 -3.0  21.0 2.4  -10.7 
Q5 (high)  78.01 -9.26  -87.27  64.63 -1.67 -66.29  59.16 15.53  -43.63 
  36.9 -1.8  -29.3  21.9 -0.2 -15.9  24.2 2.6  -12.6 
Q5-Q1  42.79 -44.09    23.47 -30.51    7.63 1.09   
  14.4 -14.8    5.6 -7.3    2.2 0.3   
 
Summing up, this section qualifies and reinforces the key results of section 4. 
Considering bad news, the evidence predominantly suggests that the price adjustment speed is 




5.3  Robustness  
As in section 4, the above results proved to be robust along various dimensions. First, 
the good and bad news portfolios were redefined based on earnings surprises, computed as 
actual announcements of quarterly earnings minus the average of analyst forecasts recorded in 
the previous month (see section 3 for details on the definition). In this case, we focus on 
stocks whose immediate reaction is in line with the news, following the logic described in 
section 4. Tables A.3 and A.4 in the appendix replicate tables 5 and 6 with this alternative 
measure of the effect of the news; the main messages summarized above are confirmed. This 
represents a strong robustness check, as the number of observations in the average portfolio 
drops by 40 to 50 percent, depending on the proxy considered. Other checks yield 
qualitatively unchanged results (not reported). Abnormal returns were computed as in section 
4 (the stock return over the relevant period minus the value-weighted market return in the 
same period), or as beta-adjusted abnormal returns, as in DellaVigna and Pollet (2009). 
Moreover, we split our 1985-2005 sample period into two subsamples of equal length. Third, 
we computed delayed returns over the two or three months following the earnings 
announcement. Fourth, we pooled stocks in the first and second uncertainty quintiles, and 
analyzed their behavior vis-à-vis those in the fourth and fifth quintiles.  
6.   Asymmetric responses to good versus bad news 
So far, we have focused on differences in price continuation patterns and adjustment 
speed across high vs. low uncertainty stocks. The other main cut emerging from our results 
concerns the bad vs. good news portfolios. Consider the results obtained with the PEAD data 
(table 6). Among low uncertainty stocks, the shares for the bad news groups are larger than 
for the good news group in five out of six cases, and significantly so in two (panel B). This  41
suggests that the adjustment speed tends to be the same across good and bad news, or to be 
relatively low for the latter group. For the high uncertainty portfolios the shares are always 
significantly larger for the bad news groups. This evidence is reinforced further by the 
median-based estimators in panels C and D: now the difference 
G  -
B   is negative for both 
the low and the high uncertainty stocks, and consistently significant for the latter group.
19  
The evidence from analyst forecast revisions (table 3) is in line with these findings for 
the high uncertainty portfolios. For the low uncertainty portfolios, both the median- and 
mean-based estimators predominantly suggest that the speed of adjustment is the same across 
good and bad news.  
Summing up, this evidence strongly suggests that the prices of high uncertainty stocks 
adjust to good news more rapidly than to bad news. For the low uncertainty stocks, the 
evidence in favor of such conclusion is weaker. 
7.  Summary evidence and discussion  
In this section we first summarize the evidence presented thus far, extracting the 
“stylized facts” emerging from the previous two sections. Next, we provide a discussion of 
two possible determinants of these facts. 
7.1  Summary evidence  
We now resort to a principal component analysis to extract a common factor from our 
uncertainty proxies. Stocks are then sorted and divided into uncertainty quintiles based on this 
common factor, and the usual analysis of the four portfolios (good vs. bad news, high vs. low 
                                                 
19    The s estimated as ratio of means (panel A) yield mixed results for the low uncertainty portfolios: three 
proxies signal that the adjustment speed is higher in the case of bad news, one suggests the opposite, two 
suggest no difference. By contrast, for the high uncertainty portfolios four out of six proxies support the 
conclusion that the adjustment to good news is faster, the remaining two yield non significant statistics.   42
uncertainty) is performed. The procedure is repeated for the two news used above: analyst 
forecasts revisions and earnings announcements. The results are reported in table 7.
20 
While based on a new indicator of uncertainty, the table is consistent with the 
evidence of the previous sections, and it serves as a useful summary of the results seen thus 
far. The shares and the median-based measures of adjustment speed, in panels B through D, 
suggest the following conclusions: (i) the prices of high uncertainty firms tend to react to bad 
news more slowly than those of low uncertainty firms; (ii) the prices of high uncertainty firms 
tend to react to good news with equal speed (according to post-analysts drift data) or more 
rapidly (according to PEAD data) than those of low uncertainty firms; (iii) among high 
uncertainty stocks, the price adjustment is faster in the case of good news than in the case of 
bad news, whereas for the low uncertainty stocks the adjustment speed tends to be more 
symmetric.  
These results are only partly confirmed by the ratio between delayed and immediate 
mean returns (panel A). As argued above, when conflicting messages emerge from median- 
and mean-based indicators of adjustment speed, the former should be preferred for our 
purposes. 
Summing up, our findings do not support the popular thesis that price continuation is a 
consequence of investors’ underreaction to news on high uncertainty stocks. In fact, while 
underreaction – either related to behavioral biases or rational causes – would imply the same 
negative relationship between stock price adjustment speed and uncertainty regardless of the 
type of news, we find that the sign of the relationship differs across bad and good news 
                                                 
20   We use the first common factor of the principal component analysis, which explains about 32 percent of 
total variation in both datasets. The related loadings are sizeable for all the proxies (no less than 0.37) with 
the exception of DISP (0.04 in both datasets). Considering this fact, and recalling from section 3 that DISP 
is missing by construction for stocks covered by just one or no analysts, which are likely to be opaque, we 
re-run the principal component analysis based on the other five uncertainty proxies only. The results (not 
reported) confirm and strengthen the evidence in table 7.   43
stocks. How does this evidence relate to previous literature, and what interpretation could be 
consistent with it?  
 
Table 7 - Summary of measures of adjustment speed from sections 4 and 5 
(percentage values; t statistics in italics) 
The 
U measure the ratio between delayed and immediate abnormal stock returns; 
U=0 corresponds to immediate price 
adjustment, positive values to sluggish adjustment, negative values to price reversal. We ran a principal component analysis 
on our six uncertainty proxies (1/MV, 1/COV, 1/AGE, SIGMA, CVOL, DISP; see section 3 and the note to table 2 for their 
definition and construction methodology). Stocks were then sorted and divided into uncertainty quintiles based on the first 
principal component, which explains 32 per cent of total variation in both datasets, and the usual analysis of the four 
portfolios (good vs. bad news, high vs. low uncertainty) was performed. The procedure was repeated for our two datasets - 
the analyst forecasts revisions data and the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) data, analyzed in sections 4 and 5, 
respectively.  
 
News is:  ANALYST FORECAST REVISIONS  QUARTERLY EARNINGS RELEASES (PEAD) 
  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad 
Uncertainty  Panel A:
U estimated as ratio between delayed and immediate mean abnormal returns 
Q1 (low)  -5.21 5.64  10.85  19.55 40.48  20.93 
  -1.2 1.4 1.5 3.1 8.0  2.1 
Q5 (high)  0.92 8.61  7.69  39.58 27.21 -12.37 
  0.3 3.6  1.6  5.5 4.2 -1.0 
Q5-Q1  6.13 2.97    20.03 -13.27   
  1.1 0.6    2.1 -1.5   
  Panel B: Share of stocks displaying price continuation 
Q1 (low)  49.10 51.93 2.83 55.48 56.19  0.70 
  -0.9 1.6 1.8 5.5 5.5  0.5 
Q5 (high)  53.57 49.35 -4.22  58.67 50.76  -7.91 
  3.4 -0.5  -2.7  6.8 0.7 -4.8 
Q5-Q1  4.47 -2.58    3.19 -5.42   
  3.1 -1.5    2.0 -3.5   
  Panel C: 
U estimated as ratio between delayed and immediate median abnormal returns 
Q1 (low)  -0.05 6.93 6.99  46.30 42.04  -4.26 
  0.0 1.4  1.0  6.0 5.1 -0.4 
Q5 (high)  10.81 -2.76  -13.57  66.74 4.97 -61.77 
  2.1 -0.6  -1.9  7.3 0.6 -5.2 
Q5-Q1  10.86 -9.70    20.44 -37.07   
  1.6 -1.4    1.7 -3.3   
  Panel D: 
U estimated as median of ratios between delayed and immediate abnormal returns
Q1 (low)  -1.94 4.50 6.45  32.30 32.44  0.14 
  -1.6 1.4 3.3  10.5 4.3  0.0 
Q5 (high)  10.06 0.50 -9.56  62.07 3.65 -58.43 
  6.5 0.2  -4.8  20.3 0.5 -13.4 
Q5-Q1  12.01 -4.00    29.77 -28.80   
  6.9 -1.8    6.8 -6.7   
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7.2  Short-sale constraints  
One theory with implications for price continuation patterns and adjustment speed is 
the Miller (1977) “divergence of opinion premium” hypothesis. By keeping pessimistic 
investors out of the market, short sale constraints should prevent negative information from 
being fully impounded into prices, yielding higher stock valuations and lower future returns. 
Miller argues that the effect should be proportional to the divergence of opinions among 
investors about the stock’s valuation, which is related to the uncertainty which we try to 
measure with our proxies. 
There is an ample and controversial literature on this overvaluation effect. The 
empirical evidence is mixed.
21 Its theoretical foundations have been questioned by Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1987), who show that the effect need not hold under rational expectations. 
Their model predicts that short sale constraints should slow down stock price reaction to 
private information, and that the adjustment speed should be relatively low in case of bad 
news. Beber and Pagano (2010) find broad support for these predictions, and survey several 
other supporting empirical papers. Boehmer and Wu (2010) show that short sale constraints 
increase price delays (in particular, an above-median shorting activity tends to eliminate the 
post-earnings announcement drift for the most negative quartile of earnings surprises). 
However, much of this evidence is based on the time series properties of returns (e.g. 
autocorrelation patterns) during periods with and without short sale constraints, and therefore 
it is ill-suited to assess how the release of public information affects stock prices.  
                                                 
21    Chang, Cheng and Yu (2007) find that the removal of the short sale constraint on individual stocks traded on 
the Hong Kong market is associated with statistically significant post-event declines in cumulative abnormal 
returns, and that this pattern is more pronounced for stocks characterized by large dispersion in investor 
opinions about valuation (measured by proxies akin to our DISP). Other papers are less supportive of this 
hypothesis. Exploiting the experience of the recent financial crisis, Beber and Pagano (2010) find that the 
adoption of a short sale ban had a positive effect on stock prices in the US, in line with the Miller effect, but 
not in all the other 29 countries in their sample. They argue that the US result might be spurious, being 
influenced by the concomitant announcement of policy measures aimed at supporting financial institutions.  45
To assess whether short sale constraints may be important determinants of our results 
we look at three types of evidence. First, the Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) model also 
yields one prediction concerning public information releases in the presence of short sale 
constraints: they should cause a large immediate absolute stock prices reaction, relative to the 
no constraints case.
22 Indeed, the evidence in tables 2 and 5 is coherent with this theory, to the 
extent that our measures of uncertainty are also proxying for the difficulty of shorting stocks. 
However, we also saw in figures 2 and 3 that the relatively large immediate response of high 
uncertainty stocks is apparently reflecting relatively large shocks.  
Second, if short sale constraints were an important driver of patterns (i)-(iii) illustrated 
above, we should detect differences in these patterns across stocks that are relatively hard to 
short vs. those that are easy to short. To explore this possibility, using the quarterly earnings 
release data we first pooled stocks in the fourth and fifth market capitalization quintiles (first 
and second quintiles of 1/MV), which should typically be more liquid and less affected by 
short-selling constraints,
23 and analyzed their behavior according to our other five uncertainty 
proxies. We then contrasted these results with those obtained when pooling stocks in the first 
and second market capitalization quintiles. We find that our results (i) through (iii) are 
confirmed both among small and large firms (results not reported).  
Third, we check whether the delayed returns following quarterly earnings surprises are 
affected by a downward drift, regardless of the news type affecting the stock at time T. 
Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) form portfolios of stocks based on the dispersion in 
analyst earnings forecasts (without conditioning to good or bad news), and find that higher 
dispersion in a given month is associated with lower returns the following month. They 
                                                 
22   The intuition is that when public information is released, stock prices “make up” for the relatively slow 
adjustment to private information experienced in previous periods. Reed (2007) confirms this prediction 
using quarterly earnings surprises. 
23    Small firm stocks are arguably hardest to short and least likely to have traded options. There is evidence that 
firm size is directly related to short selling (D’Avolio (2002)).  46
interpret this evidence as supporting the Miller overvaluation hypothesis. To check whether a 
similar effect may be at work in our case, we look at the behavior of stocks in the “no news” 
group (those recording an absolute value of 
j
T T r 1 , 1    of less than 0.5 percent), which we have 
overlooked thus far. In principle, since these are “no news” stocks by definition, on average 
they should record no delayed reaction. It turns out that the return of these stocks in the month 
following the portfolio formation is close to zero for the low uncertainty portfolios (-0.02 
percent on average across our six uncertainty proxies), whereas it is negative (-0.44 percent) 
for the high uncertainty portfolios. This suggests that high uncertainty stock prices are indeed 
subject to a (small) downward drift, which seems to be unrelated to the news release.  
Summing up, these pieces of evidence suggest that short sale constraints are unlikely 
to be the main determinants of our results, but do not allow us to rule out this hypothesis. The 
presence of a negative post-event drift among the no-news, high uncertainty portfolios of 
stocks indicates that some effect is at work which is not strictly related to news releases. 
D’Avolio (2002) argues that short sale costs tend to be increasing in the divergence of opinion 
among investors about a stock’s valuation. Thus, to the extent that uncertainty about a stock’s 
valuation translates into divergence of opinion among investors, all our six measures of 
uncertainty might also be proxying for short sale constraints.
24 Further work on this issue 
requires more precise measures of short sales constraints. 
7.3 Managers’  discretion   
An alternative mechanism which could rationalize our findings is related to managers’ 
incentives and degree of discretion in managing information flows. Hong, Lim and Stein 
(2000) show that momentum among small firms or firms with low analyst coverage mainly 
                                                 
24    See the discussion and the references in Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002)).   47
stems from the “losers” portfolio, and argue that “bad news travels slowly”, especially for 
high uncertainty firms. This is in line with our finding (i). Finding (ii) supports the 
complementary hypothesis, i.e. that “good news travels fast”, especially for high uncertainty  
firms. This hypothesis is also suggested by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000): “Think of a firm that 
has no analyst coverage but is sitting on good news. To the extent that its managers prefer 
higher to lower stock prices, they will push the news out the door themselves, via increased 
disclosures, etc.” DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) rationalize the slow impact of new 
information on stock prices using a model where short-term-oriented managers choose to 
release bad news on days when the fraction of distracted investors is high (Fridays in their 
analysis), so as to defuse their negative impact. This clearly implies that the same managers 
choose to release good news on “normal” days, when the price response is more immediate.  
The model proposed by DellaVigna and Pollet does not distinguish between high and 
low uncertainty stocks, but its mechanism could explain the different response to good vs. bad 
news which we document across these two groups if one is willing to accept the view that 
managers at less transparent firms have more leeway to manage information flows. In other 
words, assume that managers like to defuse bad news and anticipate good news, as argued by 
DellaVigna and Pollet,
25 and that managers of high uncertainty firms enjoy more discretion in 
managing the release of information, as suggested by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000). These two 
assumptions should have the following implications: (a) bad news should travel more slowly 
for high uncertainty stocks than for low uncertainty stocks; (b) good news should travel with 
equal speed among low uncertainty and high uncertainty stocks, or possibly more rapidly 
among the latter; (c) bad news should travel more slowly than good news for high uncertainty 
stocks. Clearly, these implications coincide with our results (i)-(iii) above.  
                                                 
25     The literature on managers incentives to communicate news to the market provides support for this view. 
For instance, Kothari, Shu and Wysocki (2008) find evidence that managers tend to delay the release of bad 
news to investors.  48
To assess whether managers’ discretion in the release of information flows is indeed 
an important determinant of our results we use analyst forecast errors, as defined in section 3. 
In section 5.3, devoted to the robustness checks, these errors have been used as an alternative 
measure of news. Here we exploit the fact that small forecast errors have also been interpreted 
as evidence of earnings management. The idea is that managers who adopt this practice will 
tend to release earnings figures that meet or moderately exceed analyst forecasts.
26 Therefore, 
for each of the bad and good news portfolios we divide stocks into two groups: those whose 
forecast error is between zero and 0.001 (the “high earnings management” group) and all the 
remaining stocks (“low earnings management”). We then compute our price sluggishness 
indicators for the bad-versus-good news, low-versus-high earnings management portfolios, as 
in section 5. Table A.5 in the appendix, whose format is analogous to table 7, shows that the 
results (i)-(iii) above are all confirmed, once “uncertainty” is replaced with “earnings 
management”.  
This evidence suggests that firms’ opaqueness, coupled with managers’ incentives, 
may indeed be an important determinant of the bad-versus-good news adjustment speed 
asymmetry we find in the data. Further research on discriminating among the possible causes 




                                                 
26   Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) show that the distribution of analyst forecast errors presents two 
asymmetries. First, there is a smaller mass to the left of zero, compared to the right. Second, the right tail is 
thinner than the left tail. They argue that the first asymmetry reflects firms that, facing actual earnings 
slightly below analysts’ consensus forecast, decide to adjust the figure  to be published to match the forecast 
(these firms “borrow for a better today”). The second asymmetry reflects firms that, facing actual earnings 
largely above analysts’ consensus forecast, decide to adjust the published figure downwards (these firms 
“save for a better tomorrow”). Recent studies show that these asymmetries are related to balance sheet 
measures of earnings management, such as abnormal accruals (see e.g. Burgstahler and Eames (2006)).  49
8. Conclusions 
A well-documented anomaly of stock prices is continuation – the fact that future stock 
returns are predictable based on public information. Attempts at explaining this anomaly have 
relied on behavioral theories, which suggest that investors suffer from cognitive biases and 
underreact to new information; alternatively, on theories of rational investors subject to 
uncertainty, or with constrained attention resources.  
The present paper argues that these theories yield sharp testable implications 
concerning the speed with which stock prices adjust to the arrival of news, and not concerning 
price continuation patterns, i.e. on the absolute magnitude of the delayed stock return. 
Specifically, if the behavioral theories of stock price underreaction are correct, and if 
behavioral biases are heightened by uncertainty surrounding the firm, as argued by several 
recent papers, then the speed with which stock prices adjust to news should be inversely 
related to the degree of uncertainty, whereas the magnitude of the delayed return (may but) 
need not. To test whether different groups of stocks are characterized by different price 
underreaction patterns to news, one must therefore measure adjustment speed, not price 
continuation patterns, on which the literature has focused thus far. 
To this end we use two different news types, which give rise to well-documented 
instances of price continuation: the post-analyst revisions price drift and the post-earnings 
announcement drift (PEAD). We form portfolios of high and low uncertainty stocks, using 
several commonly used proxies for uncertainty. Then, for each portfolio and news type, we 
compute various alternative estimators of adjustment, speed that do not depend on the scale of 
the news. A broadly coherent picture emerges from the evidence presented in the paper, 
which can be summarized as follows.  50
First, based on the two measures of news considered (analyst forecasts revisions and 
quarterly earnings surprises), we find that the high price continuation documented in previous 
literature for high uncertainty stocks is largely due to the fact that these stocks are subject to 
“larger news”; hence, both their immediate and delayed mean price reactions tend to be 
larger, in absolute value, than for low uncertainty stocks. Thus, higher price continuation need 
not imply slower adjustment, nor does higher uncertainty.   
Second, based on the same two news types, our median-based measures of adjustment 
speed (e.g. the ratio between delayed and immediate median returns) yield the following 
regularities: (i) the prices of high uncertainty firms tend to react to bad news more slowly than 
those of low uncertainty firms; (ii) the prices of high uncertainty firms tend to react to good 
news with equal speed or more rapidly than those of low uncertainty firms; (iii) the prices of 
high uncertainty stocks adjust to good news more rapidly than to bad news.  
The mean-based measure of adjustment speed (the ratio between delayed and 
immediate mean returns) does not yield clearcut results. To the extent that, when discussing 
high vs. low uncertainty stocks, one has in mind a “representative” stock for each category, 
we argue that median-based measures, although not commonly used in the literature, should 
be preferred.  
Summing up, information opacity has an effect on stock price adjustment speed, but 
this effect differs across bad and good news portfolios. This is not in line with the hypothesis, 
which we set out to test, that high uncertainty firms should be characterized by slower stock 
price reaction to news regardless of the type of news. Recent theories and findings about 
managers’ incentives and investors’ limited attention may rationalize our results (i) through 
(iii). Specifically, if managers like to defuse bad news and anticipate good news, and if 
managers at high uncertainty firms enjoy relatively more discretion about the release of 
information, as suggested by several recent papers, then one should expect to see the patterns  51
which we detect in the data. Short sale constraints are also known to influence stock price 
adjustment speed. The checks that we perform suggest that they are unlikely to be the main 
determinants of our results, but we cannot rule out their influence. Further empirical research 
could be devoted to confirming or disproving the generality of our findings (e.g. using 
additional measures of informational uncertainty, or different news events), and to a more 
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Table A.1 - Average abnormal returns and information uncertainty 
News: analyst forecast revision. All observations 
(percentage values; t statistics in italics) 
The table is the analogue to table 2, except that stocks whose current return was inconsistent with the news (those recording a 
negative analyst forecast revision and a positive return, or those recording a positive analyst forecast revision and a negative 
return) are now kept in the dataset. For each month T in the sample we partition stocks into 3 groups, depending on whether 
the forecast revision in T is positive, zero or negative. Within the positive and negative forecast revision groups we then sort 
stocks into 5 quintiles, based on six proxies for information uncertainty measured in T, and compute average returns for each 
quintile over the 1985-2005 period. Panel A reports returns in T; returns in T+1 are in panel B. t statistics, in italics, are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and to clustering within periods. See Section 3 and the note to table 2 for details.  
Panel A: Abnormal returns in the month of the positive or negative forecast revision  
   Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE 
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news Good - bad   Bad news  Good new Good - bad   Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  -0.13 2.32  2.45  17.7 -1.03 2.55  3.57  18.3  -0.98 2.32  3.30  19.8 
Q2  -0.58 3.02  3.59  19.5 -1.25 2.83  4.08  21.2  -1.15 3.00  4.15  22.3 
Q3  -0.98 3.70  4.67  22.6 -1.51 3.44  4.95  24.1  -1.43 3.54  4.98  22.7 
Q4  -2.04 4.00  6.05  25.6 -1.86 3.94  5.80  26.7  -1.62 4.20  5.82  28.5 
Q5 (high)  -3.43 3.91  7.34  31.2 -1.50 4.43  5.92  26.3  -2.01 4.00  6.01  26.7 
Q5-Q1  -3.30 1.59   -0.47 1.88     -1.04 1.68    
  -10.8 5.0   -1.8 6.8    -2.7 4.3   
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news  Good news Good - bad   Bad news  Good new Good - bad   Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  -0.58 1.48  2.07  18.0 -0.70 1.98  2.67  15.8  -0.97 2.50  3.46  19.9 
Q2  -0.89 2.20  3.09  19.3 -1.23 2.57  3.81  21.2  -1.02 2.88  3.90  18.9 
Q3  -1.34 3.13  4.47  23.4 -1.54 3.52  5.06  23.0  -1.34 3.23  4.58  23.5 
Q4  -1.79 4.16  5.95  24.4 -1.61 4.01  5.61  21.5  -1.72 3.48  5.20  24.0 
Q5 (high)  -2.52 6.00  8.52  26.5 -1.39 4.86  6.25  22.5  -2.31 4.37  6.69  22.9 
Q5-Q1  -1.94 4.52   -0.69 2.89     -1.35 1.88    
  -3.0 6.5   -1.5 6.3    -4.4 6.7   
Panel B: Abnormal returns in the month following the forecast revision  
  Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE  
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news Good - bad   Bad news  Good new Good - bad   Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  -0.03 0.41  0.44  3.4  0.05 0.56  0.51  2.8  0.00 0.56  0.56  3.7 
Q2  0.00 0.37  0.37  2.0  -0.07 0.47  0.54  3.0  -0.05 0.99  1.04  6.3 
Q3  -0.14 0.82  0.96  4.9  -0.17 0.78  0.95  5.2  -0.16 1.00  1.16  6.6 
Q4  -0.27 1.16  1.42  7.2  -0.35 1.17  1.52  7.9  -0.21 1.11  1.32  6.9 
Q5 (high)  -0.57 1.78  2.35  13.7 -0.48 1.71  2.19  13.4  -0.60 0.92  1.52  7.8 
Q5-Q1  -0.54 1.37   -0.53 1.15     -0.60 0.36    
  -1.9 4.7   -2.2 4.3    -1.6 0.9   
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news  Good news Good - bad   Bad news  Good new Good - bad   Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  0.11 0.64  0.53  4.8  0.12 0.81  0.70  5.2  -0.19 0.68  0.87  5.0 
Q2  -0.02 0.76  0.78  6.1  -0.08 0.78  0.87  5.6  0.01 0.64  0.63  3.4 
Q3  -0.14 0.93  1.07  6.3  -0.10 0.76  0.86  4.5  -0.06 0.75  0.81  5.1 
Q4  -0.32 1.10  1.42  7.0  -0.11 0.95  1.06  5.1  -0.29 0.97  1.26  7.0 
Q5 (high)  -0.62 1.11  1.73  6.0  0.04 1.22  1.18  4.5  -0.30 1.08  1.38  5.8 
Q5-Q1  -0.73 0.47   -0.07 0.41     -0.11 0.41    
  -1.2 0.7   -0.2 0.9    -0.5 1.5   
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Table A.2 - Stock price sluggishness and information uncertainty  
News: sign of return in the month of analyst forecasts revision 
(percentage values; t statistics in italics) 
The table is the analogue to table 3, except that bad and good news portfolios are constructed based on the sign of the return in 
the month of the analyst earnings forecasts revision. Specifically, the good (bad) news portfolios comprise stocks which, in 
month T, record a nonzero revision of the average analyst forecast and an immediate return j
T r  above 0.5 percent (below -0.5 
percent). The Qs denote uncertainty quintiles, computed from independent sortings of the six proxies reported in the table. The 

U measure the ratio between delayed and immediate stock returns; 
U=0 corresponds to immediate price adjustment, positive 
values to sluggish adjustment, negative values to price reversal. See section 3 and the notes to tables 2 and 3 for details. 
Panel A: 
U   estimated  as ratio between delayed and immediate mean abnormal returns 
  Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE  
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news   Good - bad   Bad news  Good news Good - bad    Bad news  Good news    Good - bad 
Q1 (low)  -2.34 1.59  3.93  -2.80 3.01  5.81  -2.20 3.78  5.98 
  -1.0 0.8  1.8  -1.0 1.5  1.6    -0.6 1.4  1.1 
Q5 (high)  -1.44 3.43  4.87  -2.36 3.56  5.91  1.65 0.81  -0.84 
  -0.5 1.7  1.1  -0.8 1.7  1.4    0.5 0.4  -0.2 
Q5-Q1  0.90 1.85    0.44 0.55     3.85 -2.97   
  0.3 0.7    0.2 0.2     0.8 -0.9   
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad 
Q1 (low)  -7.42 4.50 11.92  -8.07 3.93 12.01  -3.74 -0.18  3.56 
  -1.6 1.2  1.6  -2.2 1.2  2.0    -1.3 -0.1  1.0 
Q5 (high)  2.37 2.52 0.15  -1.61 6.09  7.70  1.48 5.42  3.94 
  0.6 1.0 0.0  -0.5 2.4  1.5    0.5 2.5  0.9 
Q5-Q1  9.79 -1.98    6.46 2.16     5.21 5.60   
  1.4 -0.4    1.2 0.5     1.9 2.7   
Panel B: Share of stocks displaying price continuation 
  Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE 
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad 
Q1 (low)  49.93 49.40  -0.53  50.13 49.74  -0.39  50.60 49.63  -0.97 
  -0.1 -1.0 -0.6  0.2 -0.4 -0.4    0.8  -0.5  -0.9 
Q5 (high)  52.64 45.87  -6.77  51.80 46.46  -5.34  51.70 47.10  -4.60 
  3.2 -5.3 -6.0  2.2 -4.6 -4.7    2.3 -4.0  -4.4 
Q5-Q1  2.71 -3.53    1.68 -3.28     1.10 -2.54   
  2.6 -3.5    1.5 -3.3     1.0 -2.5   
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad 
Q1 (low)  48.96 49.35  0.40  47.80 48.69  0.90  49.18 48.16  -1.02 
  -1.2 -0.8  0.3  -2.2 -1.3  0.6    -1.2 -2.8  -1.1 
Q5 (high)  53.51 45.96  -7.56  52.82 48.33  -4.50  51.90 48.32  -3.58 
  3.6 -4.7 -5.8  3.1 -1.9 -3.6    2.2 -2.1  -3.0 
Q5-Q1  4.56 -3.40    5.03 -0.36     2.71 0.16   











(Table A.2 contd.) 
Panel C: 
U   estimated as ratio between delayed and immediate median abnormal returns 
  Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE 
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad 
Q1 (low)  0.42 -1.18 -1.60  0.76 -0.31  -1.06    1.52 -2.56 -4.08 
  0.2 -0.6 -0.5  0.3 -0.2  -0.3    0.5 -1.1 -1.1 
Q5 (high)  7.84 -17.40  -25.24  6.89 -11.98  -18.88    7.00 -9.05  -16.05 
  2.7 -5.7 -6.0  2.4 -4.5  -4.8    2.5 -3.7 -4.4 
Q5-Q1  7.42 -16.22    6.14 -11.67     5.47 -6.50   
  2.0 -4.4    1.6 -3.6     1.4 -1.9   
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad 
Q1 (low)  -4.56 -4.39  0.18  -7.74 -8.30  -0.56    -1.90 -7.78 -5.88 
  -1.3 -1.3  0.0  -2.2 -1.9 -0.1    -0.7 -3.5  -1.7 
Q5 (high)  10.29 -10.61 -20.90  9.16 -4.98  -14.14    7.63 -6.77  -14.41 
  3.0 -3.7 -4.7  2.8 -1.7  -3.2    2.6 -2.6 -3.7 
Q5-Q1  14.85 -6.22    16.89 3.32     9.53 1.01   
  3.0 -1.4    3.5 0.6     2.4 0.3   
Panel D: 
U   estimated as median of ratios between delayed and immediate abnormal returns 
  Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE 
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad 
Q1 (low)  -0.89 -1.28 -0.38  0.08 -0.80  -0.89    1.28 0.15 -1.14   
  -1.0 -0.6 -0.3  0.1  -0.4 -0.8    1.5  0.1  -0.9   
Q5 (high)  7.08 -5.05  -12.13  3.92 -3.74  -7.67    5.62 -4.84  -10.45   
  7.7 -2.3 -9.8  4.3 -1.8  -6.0    6.2 -2.3 -8.3   
Q5-Q1  7.97 -3.77    3.84 -2.94     4.33 -4.98   
  6.5 -3.0    3.2 -2.4     3.6 -4.0   
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad 
Q1 (low)  -1.92 0.84  2.76  -3.85 1.47 5.31    -1.39 -3.41 -2.03 
  -2.2 0.4  2.3  -3.7 0.6 3.7    -1.6 -1.6 -1.6   
Q5 (high)  11.64 -4.96 -16.60  7.28 -1.90  -9.18    6.85 -1.77 -8.62 
  13.4 -2.4 -13.9  7.1 -0.8  -6.4    7.6 -0.8 -7.0   
Q5-Q1  13.56 -5.80    11.13 -3.37     8.23 1.64   
  11.4 -4.7    7.8 -2.3     6.7 1.3    
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Table A.3 - Average abnormal stock returns and information uncertainty 
News: analyst forecast errors of quarterly earnings  
(percentage values; t statistics in italics) 
The table is the analogue to table 5, except that bad and good news portfolios are constructed based on analyst forecasts 
errors, computed as actual quarterly earnings per share minus their expected value based on average analyst forecasts, 
normalized by the stock’s lagged price (see section 3 for details). The Qs denote uncertainty quintiles, computed from 
independent sortings of the six proxies reported in the table. Abnormal returns are computed using the market model, as 
described in section 5. The heteroskedasticity robust t statistics, in italics, are obtained by regressing individual stock returns 
on a set of ten dummy variables, one for each quintile-news pair, allowing for clustering at the date level. We dropped stocks 
whose immediate abnormal return was inconsistent with the news, i.e. stocks with positive immediate (negative) returns for 
the formation of the bad (good) news portfolios. See Section 3 and the note to table 5 for details. 
Panel A: Abnormal returns in the 3-day window around negative or positive earnings surprises 
   Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE 
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news     Good - bad   Bad news  Good news    Good - bad   Bad news  Good new    Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  -3.96 4.04 8.00  30.2  -4.82 4.92  9.74  32.2  -3.74 4.00  7.73  34.0 
Q2  -4.91 4.89 9.79  31.7  -5.44 5.36  10.80  33.4  -4.80 4.97  9.77  36.0 
Q3  -5.73 5.59  11.32  35.5  -5.73 5.83  11.56  38.8  -5.58 5.68  11.26  38.5 
Q4  -6.31 6.22  12.53  43.8  -5.79 5.80  11.59  45.8  -6.38 6.38  12.75  43.5 
Q5 (high)  -6.44 6.76  13.20  61.3  -5.52 5.57  11.09  54.5  -7.00 6.60  13.59  43.1 
Q5-Q1  -2.48 2.72     -0.70 0.65     -3.26 2.60    
  -24.0 22.8     -5.2 5.9     -27.4 25.2    
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news  Good news      Good - bad   Bad news  Good news    Good - bad   Bad news  Good new   Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  -2.77 2.96 5.72  35.6  -3.29 3.43  6.73  37.5  -5.48 5.38  10.87  33.0 
Q2  -3.96 4.10 8.06  42.8  -4.24 4.33  8.57  37.0  -5.44 5.25  10.68  35.4 
Q3  -5.25 5.22  10.47  37.0  -5.09 5.21  10.30  38.1  -5.36 5.37  10.73  34.2 
Q4  -6.70 6.76  13.46  40.2  -5.68 6.03  11.71  41.6  -5.31 5.54  10.86  39.9 
Q5 (high)  -8.59 8.42  17.01  39.7  -7.10 7.06  14.16  46.5  -5.83 5.96  11.78  39.2 
Q5-Q1  -5.82 5.46     -3.81 3.63     -0.34 0.57    
  -29.9 34.9     -24.8 34.8     -3.3 4.4    
Panel B: Abnormal returns in the month following earnings surprises  
  Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE  
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news      Good - bad   Bad news  Good news     Good - bad   Bad news Good news    Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  -0.80 0.53 1.33  7.3  -0.02 0.93  0.94  4.4  -0.57 1.47  2.04  10.3 
Q2  -1.35 0.48 1.83  8.8  -0.38 1.14  1.52  6.8  -0.75 1.16  1.91  8.8 
Q3  -1.28 0.86 2.15  8.1  -0.67 0.95  1.62  6.4  -0.90 0.69  1.59  5.8 
Q4  -0.92 0.95 1.87  5.9  -1.79 0.69  2.48  9.9  -1.33 0.67  2.00  7.1 
Q5 (high)  -0.72 1.21 1.92  6.4  -2.62 0.32  2.94  9.0  -1.56 -0.02  1.54  5.3 
Q5-Q1  0.09 0.68     -2.60 -0.60     -0.99 -1.49    
  0.2 1.5     -7.0 -1.8     -2.4 -3.1    
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news  Good news      Good - bad   Bad news  Good news    Good - bad   Bad news  Good new    Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  -0.48 1.45 1.93  11.1  -0.74 1.31  2.06  12.4  -0.91 0.96  1.87  7.5 
Q2  -0.73 1.20 1.93  12.3  -0.86 1.23  2.10  8.3  -0.70 0.98  1.68  6.4 
Q3  -0.78 1.01 1.79  8.2  -0.86 1.20  2.06  7.8  -0.69 1.14  1.82  6.2 
Q4  -0.98 0.89 1.86  6.1  -0.68 1.07  1.75  5.8  -0.35 0.78  1.12  4.1 
Q5 (high)  -2.00 -0.47 1.53  4.1  -1.47 0.27  1.74  4.8  -0.85 0.30  1.15  3.4 
Q5-Q1  -1.51 -1.92     -0.72 -1.04     0.07 -0.66    
  -2.5 -3.4     -1.6 -2.8     0.2 -2.1     
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Table A.4 - Stock price sluggishness and information uncertainty  
News: analyst forecast errors of quarterly earnings  
(percentage values; t statistics in italics) 
The table is the analogue to table 6, except that bad and good news portfolios are constructed based on analyst forecasts 
errors, computed as actual quarterly earnings per share minus their expected value based on average analyst forecasts, 
normalized by the stock’s lagged price (see section 3 for details). The Qs denote uncertainty quintiles, computed from 
independent sortings of the six proxies reported in the table (see the note to table 2 and section 3 for their definition and 
construction methodology). The 
U measure the ratio between delayed and immediate stock returns; 
U=0 corresponds to 
immediate price adjustment, positive values to sluggish adjustment, negative values to price reversal. See Section 3 and the 
notes to tables 5 and 6 for details.  
Panel A: 
U  estimated as a ratio between delayed and immediate mean abnormal returns 
  Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE  
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news Good - bad   Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  20.28 13.06 -7.22  0.38 18.82  18.43    15.20 36.90 21.70   
  7.6 5.9  -2.1  0.1  8.9  5.4    5.5  16.7  6.2   
Q5 (high)  11.12 17.86 6.73  47.48 5.82  -41.67    22.31 -0.27  -22.58   
  4.0 8.4 1.9  13.3 2.1 -9.2    8.3 -0.1  -6.4   
Q5-Q1  -9.16 4.80    47.10 -13.00     7.10 -37.17    
  -2.4 1.6    10.6 -3.7     1.9 -11.6    
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news Good - bad   Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  17.42 48.99 31.57  22.62 38.23 15.61    16.65 17.79 1.14   
  6.1 20.5 8.5  6.4  12.9  3.4  6.1  7.3  0.3  
Q5 (high)  23.24 -5.58  -28.82  20.69 3.82  -16.87    14.52 5.05 -9.47   
  8.8 -2.6  -8.4  6.1 1.4  -3.9    4.2 1.9  -2.2   
Q5-Q1  5.82 -54.57    -1.93 -34.41     -2.13 -12.74    
  1.5 -16.9    -0.4 -8.6     -0.5 -3.5    
Panel B: Share of stocks displaying price continuation 
   Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE 
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news Good - bad   Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  56.20 51.96 -4.24  52.97 51.77 -1.20    55.06 53.99 -1.07   
  8.5 2.1  -3.6  4.1  2.4  -1.2    6.2 5.3  -1.0   
Q5 (high)  56.13 50.05 -6.08  60.12 49.01  -11.11    57.41 47.31  -10.11   
  6.8 0.0  -4.0  9.9 -1.0  -7.6    7.8 -2.6  -7.1   
Q5-Q1  -0.07 -1.91    7.15 -2.76     2.35 -6.69   
  -0.1 -1.2    5.7 -2.2     1.9 -5.2   
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news Good - bad   Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  54.59 55.61 1.02  55.14 54.34 -0.80    55.80 51.86 -3.94   
  5.0 5.8 0.8  5.2  3.4  -0.5    7.0 2.0  -3.2   
Q5 (high)  57.81 45.00  -12.81  56.99 48.42 -8.57    55.74 49.15 -6.60   
  8.0 -5.1  -9.3  6.4 -1.3  -5.3    5.4 -0.8  -4.3   
Q5-Q1  3.22 -10.61    1.86 -5.92     -0.06 -2.72   






(Table A.4 contd.) 
 Panel C: 
U   estimated as ratio between delayed and immediate median abnormal returns 
   Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE 
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad   Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  43.36 10.68 -32.68  19.98 10.06  -9.92  41.53 28.71 -12.82 
  7.4 2.0 -4.1  3.4  2.0  -1.3  6.1 4.8  -1.4 
Q5 (high)  44.17 3.63 -40.54  79.87 -6.87 -86.74  49.87 -18.13 -68.01 
  6.4 0.4 -3.6  9.8 -0.7 -7.0  7.2 -2.7 -7.1 
Q5-Q1  0.81 -7.05    59.89 -16.93    8.34 -46.85   
  0.1 -0.7    6.0 -1.6    0.9 -5.2   
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad   Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  35.48 42.60  7.12  49.54 27.81 -21.72  40.45 8.34 -32.10 
  4.6 5.2 0.6  5.3  2.3  -1.4  5.8 1.3  -3.4 
Q5 (high)  56.68 -40.92 -97.59  50.31 -18.65 -68.96  48.79 -12.63 -61.42 
  7.8 -5.7 -9.6  6.2 -2.4 -6.1  5.7 -1.7 -5.5 
Q5-Q1  21.19 -83.51    0.78 -46.46    8.34 -20.98   
  2.0 -7.7    0.1 -3.2    0.8 -2.2   
tttt t
 Panel D: 
U   estimated as median of ratios between delayed and immediate abnormal returns 
  Sorted by 1/MV  Sorted by 1/COV  Sorted by 1/AGE 
Uncertainty  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad   Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  34.76 9.13 -25.63  18.31 9.40  -8.90  33.22 24.86 -8.36 
  12.4 1.4  -6.8  6.5  1.3  -2.3  12.1 3.7 -2.2 
Q5 (high)  39.36 2.14 -37.22  67.10 -7.04 -74.15  45.61 -11.50 -57.11 
  15.5 0.3  -9.8  21.8 -1.0 -15.6  17.5 -1.7 -14.7 
Q5-Q1  4.60 -6.99    48.80 -16.45    12.39 -36.35   
  1.2 -1.9    10.7 -4.1    3.1 -10.1   
  Sorted by SIGMA  Sorted by CVOL  Sorted by DISP 
  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad   Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  Bad news  Good news  Good - bad  
Q1 (low)  31.53 34.82  3.29  35.65 30.49  -5.16  35.34 7.91 -27.43 
  11.9 5.4  0.9  9.8  3.5  -1.1  10.7 1.0 -6.2 
Q5 (high)  46.98 -26.75 -73.73  40.77 -13.79 -54.56  36.79 -9.78 -46.57 
  19.5 -4.2 -20.5  12.4 -1.6 -11.1  12.6 -1.2 -10.6 
Q5-Q1  15.46 -61.57    5.12 -44.28    1.45 -17.69   
  4.1 -18.1    1.0 -9.6    0.3 -4.3   
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Table A.5 - Stock price adjustment and earnings management 
News: quarterly earnings releases 
(percentage values; t statistics in italics) 
The table refers to the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) data. The 
U measure the ratio between 
delayed and immediate abnormal stock returns; 
U=0 corresponds to immediate price adjustment, positive 
values to sluggish adjustment, negative values to price reversal. Stocks were divided into a (“high earnings 
management” group and a “low earnings management” group. The first comprises stocks for which the 
analysts’ earnings forecast error (as a percentage of the lagged stock price) is between 0 and 0.001. The 
second includes all other stocks. The analysis of the four portfolios (good vs. bad news, high vs. low earnings 
management) was then performed as usual. The 0.001 threshold for the forecast error yields a number of 
observations equal to about one fourth of the total in the “high earnings management” group. Results are 
fairly insensitive to the choice of this threshold. 
 




U estimated as ratio between delayed and 
immediate mean abnormal returns 
Low  32.85 30.89 -1.96 
  6.1 6.3 -0.2 
High  59.16 15.06 -44.10 
  8.8 3.0 -3.9 
High-Low  26.31 -15.83   
  7.1 -6.1   
  Panel B: Share of stocks displaying price continuation 
Low  58.11 52.58 -5.53 
  12.4 3.9 -6.0 
High  61.22 50.37 -10.84 
  15.2 0.5 -10.3 
High-Low  3.10 -2.21   
  3.2 -2.2   
  Panel C: 
U estimated as ratio between delayed and 
immediate median abnormal returns 
Low  61.09 21.42 -39.67 
  11.7 4.3 -5.5 
High  88.91 3.47 -85.44 
  14.7 0.7 -10.7 
High-Low  27.82 -17.95   
  3.5 -2.5   
  Panel D: 
U estimated as median of ratios between 
delayed and immediate abnormal returns 
Low  50.79 16.85 -33.94 
  46.0 5.4 -21.6 
High  74.13 4.55 -69.57 
  40.1 1.3 -26.2 
High-Low  23.33 -12.30   
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